¶ To the right

norable Lorde, Wa

earle of Eſſex, Viſcount

and Lord Ferris of Chartley, Lord Bourg

chier, and Lodoine, and Knight of the moſt ho

norable order of the Garter: Kapoe

wiſheth encreaſe of knowledge

with the true feare of god.

IT pleaſed you

(righte honorable) aboute

nine yeares ago, to accepte

me into your ſeruice: and

being then deſirous to ſtu-

dye the [illegible] of reaſoning, ye made me your

reader: and vſed at ſundry times to conferre

with me in that kinde of learning. There

was in you (be it ſpoken to the praiſe of

God, and vvithout all ſuſpition of flaterie)

ſuche gende nature, eaſie to be ttained to

take pleaſure in ſtudie: and alſo a ſharpnes

of wytte redie to conceiue at the firſt ſuye

[illegible] vnderſtande ye raught: ſo that

[illegible] not, beene a lacke in

me

me, your L. had long ago profited righte vvell in this arte. The lacke vvhich vvas in mee then, and vvhich I novve remembet vvith greiſe, vvas this: I vſed no good trade to cauſe your L. to take pleaſure in ſtudye, and not to faile of your appointed houres. Verilye it is requiſite in all them, vvhich shalbe readers to men of noble birth, that beſides knovvledge and diligence to teach, they haue alſo a certaine ſleight, and cunning, to cauſe their ſcholers to delight in learning: and ſo to vſe the matter, that perſonages of high eſtate be neither dravven from the loue of their booke, by to muche forced exerciſe: nor ſuffered to loſe their appointed time of ſtudie, for lacke of a graue and alurable calling vpon, for the one breedeth a lothſomneſſe, and the other a forgetfulneſſe. But albeit that your L. hath had loſſe through my lacke of ſkill in thys point, yet it ſo falleth out novv, that manye are like to make gaine of your loſſe. For the lacke vvhich vvas in me, vvhē I ſerued your honour, hath ſince bene the chiefe occaſion vvhy I haue vvritten this booke, to make ſome parte of recompence to you. In conſi-

deration

deration vvhereof, I moſt humblye deſire you, to take in good parte, that I dedicate this ſimple vvorke vnto your L. for my deſire is, that it maye paſſe foorth vnder your protection. If you like vvell of it, I ſhall not onely thinke my paines vvell beſtovved: but my ſelf alſo to haue a ſufficient defence againſt all ill reportes. Martine Bucer read ouer this arte, in his old days, and renevved in his age, the rules that he learned thereof in his youth. If you minde to renevve your ſtudie, and once againe to aſſaye, vvhat you can do to obtaine this excellent arte, I offer vnto you my ſeruice and diligence, as maye beſt ſtande vvith your pleaſure and my calling. The rules of this arte are generall, and vpon them grovveth a general knovvledge. VVho hath a pregnant vvit, and is cumming n this facultie, ſhall haue both to ſpeake, nd to iudge, of any matter vvhatſoeuer. If arning be ioyned to vertue and honour, ſo at they three take place in one perſon at ce, it is a vvonder to ſee, hovve all mens s are bent vppon ſuch a one, and vvhat e they conceyue of his vveldoing. My er is therfore, that your L. may ſo con-

ſider of this, that as you, in two of theſe, do exceede almoſt all: ſo in the third ye might not be inferior to manye. But hauing alwayes afore your eyes the feare of God, the loue of your Prince, and the duety, you doe owe to the common wealth, your L. may liue many ioyfull dayes with your louing ſpouſe, increaſe your noble houſe with immortall fame; and finally, at the good time appointed, reſt with the Lorde Chriſt for euer.

(.:.)

The Foresspeache.

TO proue that the arte of Reasoning may be taught in englishe, I reason thus: First, we Englishmen haue wite, as wel as men of other nations haue: Wherby we conceyue what standeth with reason, and is well donne, and what seemeth to be so, and is not. We haue also framed vnto our selues a language, wherby we do expresse by voyce or writing, all deuises that wee conceyue in our mynde: and do by this meanes let men loke into our heartes, and see what wee thinke. Then, as Englishe men can compasse this Arte by wit: so can they also declare and sette it forth by speache. Nowe whereas a number of men doe suppose, that our language hath no words fitte to expresse the rules of this Arte: and where as some men do argue, that it must needes be so, bycause they that speake or write thereof at large, vse termes and wordes, that no mere English man can vnderstande: It is playn, that neyther their supposition is true: nor

yet their reaſon good. For as time doth inuent a newe forme of building, a ſtraunge faſhion of apparell, and a newe kinde of artilleric, and munitions: ſo doe men by conſent of ſpeache, frame and deuiſe newnames, fit to make knowen their ſtrange deuiſes. As for ſtraunge and inckhorne termes, (vſed of many without cauſe) they argue a miſaſe to be in the ſpeaker: but they proue not directly, that there is anye lacke in oure language: no more then the rudenes of Lawyers latine, proueth that there is a want of good wordes in the Latine tonnge. I ſee and confeſſe, that there be Plura rerum, quàm verborum genera, (that is, moe things, then there are wordes to expreſſe things by) and do know withall, that Ariſtotle founde that want in the Greeke tongue, whiche for fineneſſe of ſpeache, and ſtore of wordes, farre excelleth all other languages. Yet is there this helpe in ſpeache, that we ofte vſe manye wordes to expreſſe one thing: yea ſometimes one word is vſed to ſignifie ſundry matters. Moreouer, one language borowweth of another, and where there is want, men

men ſometimes deuiſe newe names & compounded termes. So that after a man hath conceyued anye newe deuiſe in hys heade, and is deſirous to haue the ſame publiſhed, and made common to manye, he findeth euer ſome ſhifte, by one meane or other, to make the ſame knowen. And bycauſe there is none ſo good a waye to do it by, as ſpeache, man maketh that hys chiefe meane. Thus ye may ſee the originall groundworke, & beginning of artes. Man firſte doth conceyue trim deuiſes in his heade, and then (as the Poetes doe feigne of Iupiter) is pained as a womã in trauaile, till he haue vttered and publiſhed them, to be ſene, & commended of others. So that when as artes are begon at the firſt by one, and after laboured by many, they grow by continuance of time to perfection, as well in the vtteraunce of the ſpeache, as in the deuiſe of the minde. As for deuiſing of newe termes, and compoũding of wordes, our tongue hath a ſpeciall grace, wherein it excelleth many other, & is comparable with the beſt. The cauſe is, for that the moſte parte of Engliſhe

wordes are ſhorte, and ſtande on one ſillable a peece. So that two or three of them are ofte times fitly ioyned in one.
Of theſe kinde of wordes, I haue deuyſed many, and am now to giue a reaſon of my doing. But firſt I deſire thee (gentle Reader) not to ſcoffe at them afore thou knowe what they meane: or that thou haſt founde out thy ſelfe, or learned of others, more apte and fit termes then they are. And if any mã do caſt out a reaſon, and ſay, Loquendum vt vulgus, that is to ſay, he that ſpeaketh, muſt vſe ſuch termes as the common people is in vſe withall: and therfore that we may not deuiſe newe names, but reteyne and vſe the olde. I anſwer, this common ſaying taketh place, where there are words alredy extant, and in vſe, fit to make the minde of the ſpeaker, knowne to his audience: but the matter ſtandes not ſo with vs. Therefore conſider the caſe as it is: An arte is to be taughte in that toung, in whiche it was neuer written afore. Nowe the queſtion lyeth, whether it were better to borrowe termes of ſome other toung, in whiche this ſayde Arte hath bene written: and by a litle chaunge of pro-

nun-

nouncing, to seeke to make them English wordes, whiche are none in deede: or elle of simple vsual wordes, to make compounded termes, whose seuerall partes considered alone, are familiar and knowne to all englishmen: For trial hereof, I wish you to aske of an englishman, who vnderstandeth neither Greek nor Latin, what he conceiueth in his mind, when he heareth this word a backlet, and what he doth conceiue when he heareth this terme a Predicate. And doubtlesse he must confesse, if he consider ỹ matter aright or haue any sharpnesse of wit at al, that by a backlet, he conceiueth a thing that muste be set after, and by a predicate, that he doth vnderstande nothing at all. The like shall fall forth when comparison is made, betwixt any of our new termes compounded of true english words, and the inkhorne termes deriued of straunge and forain languages: For he that is an englishman born, and vnderstandeth no toung but his owne, shal at the first, eyther conceiue the meaning of oure wordes by himself, or else soon learne them vpon an other mãs instruction and teaching: but for these inkhorne termes, it is certaine,

that

that he ſhall neither vnderſtande them by himſelfe: nor keepe them in remembraunce when he is taught theyr ſignification of o-thers, becauſe the worde can make him no helpe. We therfore, that deuiſe vnderſtand-able termes, compounded of true & auncient engliſh wordes, do rather maintain and con-tinue the antiquitie of our mother tongue: then they, that with inckhorne termes doe chaunge and corrupt the ſame, making a mingle mangle of their natiue ſpeache, and not obſeruing the propertie thereof. They that will haue no newe wordes deuiſed where there is want, ſeme not well to con-ſider howe ſpeache groweth, or wherefore it was deuiſed by man: For names are not giuen vnto things afore the things themſel-ues be inuented. Therfore olde names will not ſerue to make newe deuiſes knowen. It is a fondneſſe (I graunt) to deuiſe newe names, where there are olde in vſe, which agreeing to the propertie of the ſpeach, may ſerue the turne well enoughe. For no man is of power to change or to make a language when he will: but when fit names are deui-ſed and ſpoken, they force the hearers to

like

like of them and to vse them: and so do they by consent of manye, growe to a speache. Therfore (gentle reader) if thou doubt, what is ment, by any of our strange and new deuised termes, consider their partes, as they are taken by themselues alone: and the consideration of the partes, shall leade thee to the knowledge of the whole. But if thys shall not serue thy turne, thou maist looke in the table placed in the end of our booke, and it shall shewe thee in order their meanyng, eyther by numbers referring thee to the places, where they are plainely taughte: or making some shorte exposition of them, if there be none in the booke afore. There shalbe added also (for some mens better contentation) the Latine termes. And thus much, for proufe, that this arte maye be taught in oure mother tongue, and for defence of the termes that we haue deuised to teache and set forth the same. Nowe let vs aunswere them, which iudge it hurtfull, to haue thys arte written and setforth in englishe. They builde chiefely vppon two poyntes. First they suppose, that it shoulde bee a greate decaye and hynderaunce vnto learnyng.

Secondly,

Secondlye, that it ſhoulde miniſter vnto many, matter of contentiō and ſtrife. The firſt part of their ſuppoſition is proued to be falſe by plaine experience: for what mā of experience and wit ſeeth not, that learning did neuer ſo flouriſhe in England in our forefathers dayes, as it doth now, and hathe done of late, euen ſince men haue begon to write of Artes in our engliſhe tongue? And as for contentiō, which groweth betwixt partie and partie, when they argue and diſpute of matters to and fro: that is no fault to be imputed or aſcribed vnto arte: but an infirmitie and heate of choller, incident to the nature of ſharpe wits, and commonly chancing, when men leaue the cauſe, and beſtowe their ſpeache vpon bymatters: which thing the arte of reaſon reproueth, terming it a ſhift, and a wranglers point. But let vs conſider the profite that commeth of this arte, ſo ſhall wee beſte ſee, that learning hath no enemies, but them that are ignoraunt, & thoſe which know not what profite commeth of knowledge. This arte ſeruеth to manye ſingular purpoſes. For ſhe doth not onely

teach

teach an order to reaſon wittily of doubtfull matters, and to ſpeake forceably of them either of or on. But ſhe alſo yeldeth to them, that are cunning and experte in hir, a generall vnderſtanding to iudge of all matters whatſoeuer, and to diſcerne what is laide or done according to reaſon, and what is not. And where euery particular ſcience hath but one ſpeciall matter to intreate of, as Arithmeticke to intreate of numbers, Geometrie of bigneſſe, Phyſicke of health, &c. This faculty that we here ſpeake of, is tyed to no ſpeciall matter: but taketh in hand the debating of all things, ſo farre as wit and reaſon can extende. Hir preceptes are verye generall, and are vſed for grounded, and principles in all ſciences. She trieth whether ỹ rules of arte be true or falſe: ſhe is a ſearching faculty, by reaſon whereof ſhe teacheth a man the ſoner to eſpy, what is right, what is wrong, what maketh for him, and what maketh againſt him. But to ſpeake more particularly of hir worke, ſhe ſorteth all wordes, and placeth euery kind by it ſelfe, eaching what they ſignifie, as they are

conſidered

conſidered, and taken alone: ſhee declareth what ſenſe woꝛds do make, whē they are coupled and knit together: ſhee painteth foꝛth the perfect foꝛme of a reaſō by rule. And to conclude, ſhee doth miniſter matter to confirme, and laye foꝛth a troth: and teacheth a way, howe to diſcꝛoue, and diſcouer an errour. He that is cunnyng in this facultye, ſhall ſeeme ignoꝛaunt in no learning: and who that is altogether vnſeene in this, can be depely ſeene in none. Doubtleſſe a wiſe man muſt nedes take great pleaſure, and wonder, to ſee a fewe rules lead men to an infinite knowledge. Theſe things I trowe may pꝛofite many, ſure I am, they can harme none. A ſcholer oꝛ one that is but a beginner, maye not thinke that he ſhould vnderſtande at the firſt ſight, if perchaunce he reade in thys booke at aduenture here oꝛ there: Foꝛ the rules of this Arte are couched together like to billets in a pile of wood: ſo ỹ things that are layd downe in oꝛder, muſt be oꝛderlye taken vp: neither doe men dꝛawe out billettes at the bꝛeaſt of the pile: but they aſcend to the toppe, and taking them

in order as they riſe, they quickly diſpatch muche with eaſe: otherwyſe they ſhall hardlye in long time, wyth out one from amonges manye. And though theſe rules and termes ſeme harde at the firſt: (as all ſtrange and vnacquainted things doe) yet vſe ſhall make them eaſye. And for vnderſtanding of hard pointes, vſe theſe helpes. Firſt conſider with your ſelfe, what the authors purpoſe is in that place, how that ſpeciall point may agree with the generall iſſue: then ſeke to knowe, what euery word in the ſentence maye ſignifie by it ſelfe alone: after weigh what ſenſe they make as they are all knit, and coupled together: then trie if ought maye be put to the ſentence, or taken from it, to make it plainer or truer: Laſt of all, ſeke for diuers and ſundrye examples. &c. by theſe meanes ye ſhall at the length not onely vnderſtande the meaning of that ye reade, but alſo diſcerne & iudge, whether the ſaying be true or falſe: plaine, or obſcure. Now to let euerie writer haue his deſerued praiſe, I confeſſe (to them that deſire to knowe whom I folow) that in my three firſte bookes, I onely folow Ariſtotle: both for matter, &

alſo for order: who is in my iudgement, an author, ẏ farre paſſeth all prophane writers: not onely for that he writeth more true, and profitable things then others do: but alſo, for that his manner, and trade of writing, is more perfect and playner, then any others is ẏ I haue red. As for Ciceronians & ſuger tongued fellowes, which labour more for fineneſs of ſpeach, then for knowledge of good matter, they oft ſpeake much to ſmall purpoſe, and ſhaking forth a number of choiſe words, and picked ſentences, they hinder good learning, with their fond chatte. But in my fourth booke, which intreateth of the places, & ſheweth a way how to prouide ſtore of arguments: I haue thought good neither fully to folow Ariſtotle: nor yet anye other that I haue ſeene. For Ariſtotles inuention ſerueth beſt, for vniuerſitie men, when a queſtion is brought to ſome generall iſſue, as to proue that the backſet is, or is not, the fayr what, the kinde, the propertie, or the Inheer of the forſet. Howbeit, men vſe in diſputing or writing, to argue to and fro, neuer bringing the matter that lyeth in queſtion,

question, to anye of these foure generall issues. Nowe thoughe the latter writers, thinke they finde muche fault with Aristotle in this behalfe: yet in mine opinion, they themselues neither deuise so many places as may be deuised for store of matter: nor yet name them, or handle them so aptly or handsomly as is meete. If it be my happe, dissenting from all men in this pointe, to finde out a playner and more easye waye, then hath bene found out heretofore, thou oughtest (gentle reader) neither to blame their lacke of skill: nor much to praise my mending. For Artes are like to Okes, which by litle and litle grow a long time, afore they come to their ful bigneste. That one mã beginneth, another oft times furthereth and mendeth: and yet more praise to be giuẽ to the beginner, then to the furtherer or mender, if the first did finde moe good things, then the folower did adde. Experience teacheth, that eche thing which is inuented by man, hath a beginning, hath an increase, and hath also in time a full ripeneste. Nowe although eche worke is most commendable when it is brought to

bis full perfe. tiõ: yet where the workmen are many, there is oft times more prayse to be giuen to hym that begynneth a good worke, then to him that endeth it. For if ye consider the bookes that are now printed, and compare them with the bookes that were printed at the first (Lord) what a diuersity is there, and how much do the last exceede the first? Yet if ye wil compare the first and the last Printer together, and seke whether deserueth more praise and commendation: ye shall finde that the first did farre exceede the last. For the last had helpe of manye, and the firste had helpe of none. So that the first lighteth the candle of knowledge (as it were) and the seconde doth but snuffe it. This I write, for that some adding but patches to other mens workes, and after publishing the whole in their owne name, conueigh to themselues (as it were by stealth) the fame & prayse that others doe deserue. As for those that marre ŷ thing they take in hand to mend, do not only publishe to ŷ world their owne vnskilfulnesse, in finding out any profitable matter: but also doe bewray their vn-

habilitie

habilitie to iudge of things well found out to their handes. To ſuch I ſay, it is far more eaſier for a meane craftes man, to make a worke of his owne deuiſe, then to finiſhe the worke, that a cunning mā hath begon. I write thus much, becauſe ſome men by ſuche kinde of dealing, haue miſuſed both my doings & my name. For the booke, named the Philoſophers game, and printed about nine yeares ago, is entituled to bee ſet forth by Raphe Leuer, and to be augmented by one W. F. But I aſſure thee (gentle reader) that, ỳ pamphlet or worke neuer paſſed from mee, with ſo many & ſo groſſe ouerſightes, as in the booke nowe printed are common to be ſene. For triall wherof, I referre my ſelf to the copy that this day is extant in ſundry of my frendes handes. Surely I thinke my ſelfe muche diſcredited, and that great wrong is offred vnto me, for that the ſame is ſet forth, and ſuffred to paſſe vnder my name, without my knowledge, or aſſent. Reaſon would, that eche man ſhould beare the blame of his owne default. But I marueil moſt at him, which woulde correcte and augment

the tables that I drew forth, for beginners to loke on, when they played at this game. For sure I am, that I comprised in them, both plainly and briefly, all the examples of taking and triumphing, which are possible to be fownde, in that kind of exercise. Nowe hath this corrector or augmenter (terme him as ye will) altered, and changed mine examples, in an hundreth places, and moe: committing in eche place, a manifest errour: either leauing out them which are necessary: or interlacing them, which are altogether impertinent to this playe, or vtterly false, and not agreeing, to the rules and principles of Arithmeticke. It were therfore to be wished, ỳ no mans worke should be printed, nor no mans name put to any worke, excepte the partie firste knew therof, and were wellwilling therevnto: and that they which take in hand to amend or augmẽt another mans writing, should vse certaine markes, whereby eche mans doing might appeare by it selfe. So should eche person beare the report of hys owne desert, whether it were good or bad. There are two common markes, ỳ thys

arte

arte ſhoteth at: the firſt is, to make a good reaſon: the ſecond is, to ſhewe the faultes of an ill reaſon. Of the firſt, I haue written ſo much, as I thought conuenient and meete: of the ſecond, I mind to write hereafter, if the Lorde God ſhall make mée able, and occaſion me ſo to do. In the meantime, I haue yelded to the earneſt requeſt of my frendes: and haue publiſhed thys firſt part, without the ſeconde: not mynding for mine owne eaſe to ſtay that, which is thoughte, will yelde preſent profite to many. Learne thou (gentle reader) by this which is alreadye written, to make true reaſons, and to vſe an vpright kind of dealyng: and then ſhall no coloured or deceiuable arguments driue thée from the trueth, or leade thée into errour. Farewell from Durreſme, the. 24. of Nouember. 1572.

In the table of the faultes, reade for Fol. ſyde, and for lyne, verſe. And knowe, that a ſhewſay in Latine is called Pronunciatum, Enunciatio, or Propoſitio. Why I terme it ſo, looke. 66. 11.

¶THE FIRSTE booke of VVitcraft.

VVhat VVitcraft is.

1 VVItcraft is a cunning to frame and to answere a reason.

The partes of a reason.

2 A reason standeth of certayn sayings, and a saying of wordes.

3 So that wordes are the firste and the least partes of a reason: and therfore first to be taught and learned.

4 For he that will keepe a good trade in teaching, must begin with small and easy matters at the first, and by them proceede to greater and harder poyntes, so farre till at the last he attayne to the ende, which is first in purpose, and last in worke.

VVhat vvordes are.

5 VVordes are voyces framed with hart and toung, vttering the thoughtes of the mynde.

The first deuiding of wordes.

6 Wordes eyther agree in sounde, and differ in meaning: or they agree in meaning, and differ in sounde: or they agree in bothe: or else they dissent in both.

7 They of the fyrste sorte maye be termed Lykesounding wordes: They of ỹ secõd sort, like meaning wordes: They of the thyrde sorte, playnemeaning wordes: and they of the fourth sorte, wordes fully differing one from an other.

Wordes { Lykesounding. / Lykemeaning. / Playnemeaning. / Fully differing.

8 Lykesounding wordes, are wordes of double vnderstandyng, whiche haue one sounde of letters, and accordyng to that one sounde, diuers sayinges, expressing sundrie substances.

9 For example thus: The Woodcocke hath let my woodcocke flye away.

10 Howe thys worde Woodcocke in bothe places of thys one sentence, for sounde of letters is one and the same:

11 But if ye seeke the true meaning of this

this woꝛde Woodcocke, as it is twice placed in this one saying: ye shal fynde in eyther place, a sundꝛy sayewhat, expꝛessing in the fiꝛst place, an vnwittie man:

12 And in the second place, a bird haunting the woods, and making his flyght of pleasure onely in the twylight.

13 The double vnderstanding of woꝛdes and sayings, must be warely marked, and declaration made of theyꝛ sundꝛye meanings: that it may certainely be knowen, in what sense they are to be taken.

14 Woꝛdes restrayned to one saywhat ar no lõger woꝛds of double vnderstãding.

15 Lykemeanyng woꝛdes are one in meaning, and diuers in sound as rich, welthie: colour, hue, quickning, barme, yest:

16 Plainmeaning woꝛds haue one soũd, & accoꝛding to that one soũd, one saywhat. Univoca

17 Here we vnderstand such a saywhat as declareth the substance of a thing: and not such a one as only noteth ẏ foꝛce & signification of a woꝛde.

18 Woꝛds fully dissenting are such as haue neyther one sound, noꝛ one saywhat: as an herbe, and a tree.

The second deuision of wordes.

19 Wordes are also thus deuided, some signifie a thing that hathe his being by it selfe: some signifie a thing that hath his being in an other.

20 The first maye be called an Inholder: the seconde an Inbeer. For example thus: Man, beast, herbe, tree, corne, grasse, stones, metiall, fire, ayre, water, earth, and all other substaunces bodyed, or bodylesse, are Inholders:

21 But length, breadth, thicknesse, weight, measure, number, power, shape, vertue, cunning, sleight, vice, ignorance, heate, colde, moystnesse, drynesse, and all other wordes placed in any storehouse, (except the storehouse of substance) are inbeers.

an { Inholder / Inbeer } is called in latin { Subiectū. / Accidens.

The thirde deuision of wordes.

22 There is a third deuision of wordes to be likewise considered.

23 For some wordes are common, and are affirmed of many things, as man is sayde

sayde of many seuerall men.

24 Some are sole wordes, and are sayd but of one thing alone: as Iohn, or this man, are sayd of no moe men then one.

a {common / sole} worde.

Certaine preceptes or generall rules to be learned afore ye enter into the treatise of the storehouses.

25 Ther are rules in euery arte, which authors vse as groundes and sure principles, not to be denyed or doubted of.

26 For if nothing shoulde be cleare and certaine of it selfe: then should we be driuen by wranglers from point to point, to make reason vppon reason infinitely, and neuer come to issue of any one matter.

27 Therfore hath God appoynted some things to be euident and certaine of them selues, that they might be as stayes to mans wit, and as helpes to fynde out and to discusse things that are not so euident as they are.

28 And this is the cause why ye maye not aske of a Principle why so: yet maye principles bee opened to beginners by examples,

29 Whyche is a kynde of proofe by Experience, thoughe it bee no proofe by rule.

30 A common Inholder is sayde of others: but it hathe not hys beeing in an other.

31 A sole Inholder is neyther sayde of any other thing, besides it selfe: nor yet hath his beeyng in any thing, but in it selfe.

32 A common Inheer is bothe sayde of others: and hathe also his beeyng in others too.

33 A sole Inheer, hath his beeing in an other: but it is not sayde of any other.

34 Diuers kyndes, whereof one is not subiecte to an other, haue sundrye kynreds, and sundrie differences, as a wight and an arte.

35 For the kinreds of a wyghte, are man and beaste: but the kinreds of arte are, The arte of numbryng, the arte of measuring, witcrafte, speachcraft, starre-

craft,

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Citie, or in the fielde, whych sayinges are referred to the Storehouse where.

51 If ye be asked when this man or that man dyd this or that: yée must aunswere, an houre, a daye, a weeke, a moneth, a yeare ago, which sayinges are ascribed to the Storehouse when.

52 If ye bée asked how is man placed: ye must aunswere, he lyeth, he sitteth, he beweth, he leaneth, he frowneth, he smileth, whych wordes doe euer insynuate a placing.

53 If ye bée asked how man is apparelled or furnished: ye must aunswere, he is naked, clothed, armed, weaponed, booted, shodde, frended, monyed, wyued, whych wordes doe alwayes importe an hauing.

54 Here yée must take héede that euery demaunder haue suche an aunswere happen vnto it, as maye bée placed in the Storehouse, whereto the Demaunder properlye belongeth: other wayes, yée shall not aunswere directlye nor to the purpose.

Of

Of Substaunce the first Storehouse. Chap. 2.

1 Substaunce is an inholder, the verye groundworke, stay, and vpholder, of quantities, qualities, and all other inheers.

Howw substaunce is deuided.

2 There is a sole substance, and a common substaunce.

A { Sole / Common } Substaunce.

3 A sole substaunce, is a substaunce peculiar and proper to one selfe thing alone, as John, William, this man, or that man.

4 For although many men be called by the name of John, or William, yet when wee adde John, William, or anye other proper name to man, or els adde this, or that to any common worde: wee meane to separate it from all other thinges, and to poynt out a sole thing: so that though these names bee referred to many men, yet the thing meant by them is one selfe thing.

5 A common substaunce is either a kinred,

red, or a kynd, conteyning many sole substaunces, as a horse is a kinred, conteining al particuler horses: and a wight is a kynd conteyning al kinredes of beastes, flying, swymming, going, creeping, drawing, or stillstanding.

Of certayne peculiar rules vvhich belong to the storehouse of substance.

1

6 A Sole substaunce is neither sayde of another: nor yet hath being in another.

7 That a sole substaunce is not saide of another it is plaine by examples.

8 For John is verified of nothing in the world, but of himselfe.

9 He is verified of himselfe when wee saye, this man is John, for in this saying, John and this man signifie both one substaunce, though the termes be diuers.

10 And where wee saye, that a sole substaunce hath no being in another, it is proued of the generall rule: which is,

11 That euery substaunce hath a being by it selfe: and not a beyng in another thing.

12 That

12 That hath beyng by it selfe, whych is knowen to stande in nature by it selfe, and to haue nede of no other thyng, to suppo3te and beare vp his beyng, as an ho3se, an Ore. &c.

13 But that hath beyng in an other thyng, and no staye of it selfe, whych is in an other not as a parte, and yet can not bee wythout the thyng in whych it is.

14 As learning is in man, as no part of man, and yet can not bee wythoute man, o3 some other substance apt fo3 the same: as fo3 substaunces they haue beyng of themselues, and nede no other thing to suppo3t them.

2

15 Sole substaunces occupye at one tyme, but one place. Common substances are in no place p3operly and fitly.

16 We saye p3operly and fitly, because they are sayde, vnfitly and after a so3te, to bee in manye places at once: by reason, all their partes (which are Sole substances) doe at one moment of tyme, eche one occupy his seuerall roume.

3

17 A part of any sole substance is no substãce: but if it be cut of frõ his whole, thẽ is it no lõger a part, but a substãce by it self.

18 For if the partes of a Sole substance shoulde be substaunces: then shoulde there be no diuersitye betweene a common and a Sole substaunce.

19 For they differ in this, ỹ a Sole substãce conteineth but one substance where a cõmon substãce conteyneth many: now where euery whole conteyneth many partes, it shoulde folow, ỹ if euery parte of a Sole substance were a substaunce: then should Sole substaunces conteyne manye substances, as comunen substaunces do.

20 Howbeit, in very deede a Sole substaunce conteyneth many partes and is but one substaunce in the whole.

4

21 Sole substances are most properly called substaunces: among common substaunces that alwaies which is nerer to a Sole substaunce is more properly called a substaunce, then that which is further of: as kinred rather then kynd: yet substãces

of

of like condition and sort, do admit no degrees of more or lesse.

22 As one man is no more a substaunce, nor no lesse a substaunce then an other mã is: this man rather then this horse.

23 For though this man bee greater or lesser, worse or better then that man is: yet they are not so saide, in respect of substaunce: but in respecte of quantityes and qualities.

24 The lyke reason may serue for kinreds and for kindes.

5

25 Sole substaunces receyue contraries by a certaine chaunge that is in them selues, as one man some times good, some times bad, some times hote, some tymes colde.

26 Certaine other things may receyue contraryes as well as sole substances do.

27 For this saying: Socrates is sicke, maye bee bothe true and false at diuers tymes.

28 Yet is there this diuersitie, that whē sole substaunces do receyue contraries, it is euer by a certayne chaunge, which is in the

the substaunces themselues: but when a saying receyueth contraryes, there is no chaunge in the saying, but in the matter expressed by the saying.

6

29 One substance is not contrary to an other substance, neither is there any other thing contrary to a substance at all.

30 For contraries are two inbeers which driue by course one another oute of their inholder, as hote and cold drive one an other out of some bodied substance.

31 Thoughe water driue aire, and aire water out of some vessell: yet these and such like driue eche other as out of a place, being inholders, and not as out of an inholder being inbeers.

32 Euery Sole substaunce standeth of one inholder and many inbeers, in suche sort that neither the inholder coulde haue any being, if all inbeers were taken from it: neither could the inbeers, haue their being alone by them selues, without some inholder, to support and beare them.

33 The thing that standeth of one inhol-

der, and many inbeers, is called a sole substaunce: for example thus.

34 Any one man is a Sole substance, hys inbeers are length, grossenes, talnes, yeares, vertue, vice, learnyng, ignoraunce, sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, feelyng, sowernesse, swætenesse, colour, shape, beautye, doyng, suffering, office, Lordship, and other thyngs in manner infinite: hys inholder is that Sole nature, that beareth all these.

35 Now as quantities, qualityes, and other inbeers can not bee but in some substaunce: so Sole substaunces should haue no beyng in dæde, if all inbeers were sequestred and taken from them.

36 Further if all Sole substaunces were taken awaye, then shoulde both all common substaunces be taken away, and all inbeers too.

How Substance is deuided.

37 Substaunce doth admit manye deuisions accordyng to hys manyfolde and gaynest differences, as .1. a bodyed substaunce,

ſtaunce, a bodyleſſe ſubſtaunce. 2. a mor-tall ſubſtaunce, an immortall ſubſtaunce. 3. a naturall ſubſtaunce, an artificiall ſub-ſtaunce, or a ſubſtaunce partlye artifi-ciall partly natural. 4. a lyuing ſubſtance, a lyucleſſe ſubſtaunce. 5. a fælyng ſub-ſtaunce, a ſubſtance voyde of ſenſe. 6. a reaſonable ſubſtaunce, a wytleſſe ſub-ſtaunce. 7. a moueable ſubſtaunce, an immoueable ſubſtaunce. 8. a tame ſub-ſtaunce, a wylde ſubſtaunce. 9. an earth-lye ſubſtaunce, a watery ſubſtaunce, an airye ſubſtance, a fyerye ſubſtance. &c.

Here foloweth the table of Subſtaunce.

Of the seconde Storehouse called Quantitie.

Chap. 3.

1 Quantitie is that whereby all thinges are knowne, how many or how fewe, how much or how litle they are.

Howe Quantitie is deuided.

2 Some quantities stand of seuered and vncoupled partes: as number, speach: some of partes that are ioyned and fastned together by some common bounder: as a line, an ouerthew, a body, time and place.

3 A common bounder is the end of one thyng and the beginnyng of another, and yet part of neither.

The cō-	Lyne		Prycke
mō boū-	Ouerthew		Lyne
der of a	Body	is a	Ouerthew
	Tyme		Moment
	Place		Lyne

4 That the partes of number are not ioyned or knit together by anye common beūder it is plain by particular examples.

5 For

5. For three and fiue being the partes of eight, are not coupled together by any cõmon bounder: neither can one shew in a number any common bounder where the partes do mete and ioyne together.

6 The like may be saide of speech, for though sillables and words haue some more time in pronouncing, & some lesse, yet are they not ioyned one to another, without pause at all, for then there should be no distinction in speache.

7 That speache is placed in this frame, house, it is plain, because it is measured by sillables short and long.

Another diuision of Quantitie.

8 Quantitie admitteth also this diuision that some stande of partes which haue a placing one by another, some stand of parts which haue no placing at all.

9 A line, an ouerthew, a body and a place stand of parts that haue a placing, for that their parts are seene to lye somewhere.

10 But in number no mã can shew how his partes are placed one by another, or where they are set, or how they are ioyned

or coupled together.

11 The like may be saide of tyme, for seeing the partes of tyme stay not, howe can they admit any placing.

12 Yet there is an order among the parts of time and number: because one tyme commeth before, and another time cōmeth after, and in the natural rewe of numbers one is reckned afore two, and two afore three, but placing of partes are not eyther in number or time.

13 The like maye be saide of speache also, for eche worde and syllable passeth away as it is spoken, so that the partes of speach tarye not, nor stay not to haue anye placing.

14 The least thing that can be imagyned in a number is one: and the least thing that can be imagyned in a lyne is a pricke: here note that one is a parte of eche number, but a pricke is a bounder of a lyne and therfore no part therof.

15 A number is a multitude of ones.

16 A lyne is length without bredth.

17 An overshew is length, and bredth, without thicknesse.

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Of the deuision of Qualitie.

2 This storehouse is parted vnto foure seuerall roomes.

3 The firste roome conteyneth those qualities which are giuen to the inholder by nature, and those also which come by reason nature is letted of hir course.

4 The second roome conteyneth those which the inholder getteth by doyng.

5 The thirde conteyneth sensible qualities, and affections of the mind.

6 The fourth conteineth the shape and forme of euery thing.

Of Qualities first roome.

7 In the first rooms are placed all the powers eyther of the bodye alone; of the soule alone, or all that, that standeth of the both: to this place are added also, al weakenesse and want of power naturall.

8 Weakenesse and want, differ in thys, for that of Weakenesse there bothe proceeds imperfecte actions: but of want

want there can arise no action at all.

9 As bleardnesse causeth a man through weakenesse of sight to iudge vnperfectely of colours: but blyndnesse through want of sight, lettes a man to giue any iudgement of colour at all.

10 Power is a gifte of nature, whereby the Inholder may the better doe, or with lesse harme suffer.

11 The common Inholder of wordes placed in this roume is very generall. For there is no substance which hath not some power.

12 Here is to be noted, that no inholder is sayde to want any power, which eyther nature hath not appointed it should haue: or else the tyme of hauing it, is not fully expired.

13 For it is vnproperly said, that either a stone, or a chylde newe borne, wanteth power to goe or to runne of it selfe. For God hath not ordeyned that a stone should goe or runne at all: and the tyme is not yet come, for a newe borne chylde to doe eyther.

14 But if the tyme bee fully expyred when

when as nature hath appoynted, that chil-dren ſhould goe and runne of themſelues, and that certain children at that tyme can doe neyther: then may it well be ſayde, that ſuche children lacke power to go, and are lame.

15 Here is to be noted, that from power to want, we may fall both by nature and by chaunce: but to returne from want to power agayne, it is impoſſible.

16 As from ſight to blyndneſſe, from ſpeache to dumbneſſe, we may fall at any tyme: but the returne from dumbneſſe to ſpeache, or from blyndeneſſe to ſight, is a thing that can not be brought to paſſe, eyther by arte, or nature, or anye other meane, (Gods extraordinarie doings only excepted.)

17 Note further, that the power is not alwayes taken awaye where the inſtrument is hurt for a tyme, or letted: as if a mans eyes, tonng, and eares, were ſo hurt for a tyme, or letted, that he coulde neyther heare, ſpeake, nor ſee,

18 Yet were it not for all that to be ſayde, that the power of his ſeeing, ſpeaking,

king or hearing were taken awaye or diminished: but rather that the action and worke of his eares, toung, and eyes, were letted for a tyme.

19 If the instrumente of sense be so hurt, that it be vncurable, and neuer able to do any part of his worke, then do we saye, that the power is vtterly destroyed or taken away.

20 Memorie of things past, iudgemēt of things present, forsight of things to come, & other qualities of the mynd, as they are giuen to any inholder by nature, are placed in the first rowme of qualitie: but as they are increased by arte and diligence, in the seconde.

Of Qualities second roome.

21 Qualities that are gotten by doing, are eyther deepely rooted in their inholder, and continue in it long: or else they come and goe lightly, and tarie but a short time.

22 Vertue, vice, sciēce, knowledge, arte, crafte, cunning, sleyght, vse. &c. whiche a man can not soone alter and chaunge, are

are suche dispositions, as commonly take deepe rote in their inholder, and by reason of long vse, and many actions whereof they growe and spring, they maye bee called grounded dispositions.

23 But sodeyn anger, light displesure, small knowledge, a smattering sight. &c. for that they spring and ryse of fewe actions, come & go lightly, and therefore may be termed wauering dispositions, these being as it were, the first entrie into setled dispositions.

24 The inholder of qualities placed in this roome is not so generall, as is the inholder of those of the firste roome. For this inholder is but eche wight, which by practise can attayne to any good or badde trade, in doing of things well or yll.

Of Qualities thirde roome.

25 In the third roome of this storehouse wee place all suche qualities as eyther properly moue one of the fiue senses: as coloure moueth sighte: sounde hearing: sauoure smelling: taste tasting: heate colde:

colde, moystnesse, drynesse, hardnesse, softnesse, and feeling.

26 Of these the affections of the mynde, as mirth, gladnesse, griefe and feare, with other affections whiche spring of these in maner infinite: as mercie, pitie, loue, benignitie, softnesse of mynde, hope, affiaunce, trust, enuie, hate, disdayne, spyte, distrust, contempte, palenesse, blushing, trembling. &c.

27 Affections consydered as they are giuen of nature, muste bee placed in the firste roome of thys storehouse: but consydered as they are gotten by doing, in the seconde: and beeyng taken as they moue the outward or the inward sense, in the third: we see, heare, smell, taste, & feele,

28 By receiuing a certaine influence, and sufferyng of an action that doeth proceede from the thing seene, heard, smelt, tasted, or felte, into suche partes of eche wightes bodie, as hath in it those foresayd senses.

Of Quantities fourth roome.

29 In this roome are placed the forme & figure, shape, and fashion of euery thing.

30 The

30 The inholder of woꝛds in the third oꝛ fourth roome of this ſtoꝛehouſe, is the ſame that is of thoſe whiche are placed in the firſt roome.

Of Qualified things.

31 There are certayne woꝛdes whiche do ſignifie qualified things, relation had, bothe to the qualitie, and to the inholder thereof.

32 As a iuſt man, a liberal man, a craftesman, a lame man: oꝛ iuſt, liberal, lame, without adding the inholder in whyche they are. Theſe are to be placed in the roomes of the qualities, wherof they are deriued.

Of the propreties of qualities, and of qualified things.

33 Some qualities and qualified things haue contraries, and ſome haue none: as right is contrarie to wꝛong: and a righteous man is contrary to an vnrighteous man.

34 But qualities and qualified things whiche are placed in the firſt and fourthe roome: yea and many of thoſe which are

placed in the seconde and thirde rowme, of this storehouse, admitte no contraries at all.

35 Qualities and things qualified, admit degrees of more and lesse, as among many learned men it is commonly seene that one is more or lesse learned then an other.

36 This rule taketh place not in all. For among many circles, triangles, and squares, one is not sayde to bee rather a circle, then an other: or rather a triangle, or a square.

37 Here is to be noted, that qualities considered as they are in some inholder, admitte degrees of more and lesse: but if ye in minde sever them from their inholder, and consider them apart, (as ye define them and tell what they are) then doe they admitte no degrees of more or lesse.

38 For all and every arte of Physike doe equally and indifferently agree to the say what of Physike: but Hippocrates physike, and Fuchsius physicke admit degrees, the one beeyng more and the other lesse,

leſſe, and ſo dothe Fuchſius phyſicke alone conſidered, when he had great experience, and when he had ſmall.

39 To make things lyke or vnlyke, is a worke belonging only to qualitie.

40 If any man gaynſay this rule, affirming that it is commonly and truely ſayde, howe that one man is lyke or vnlike to an other, in going, ryding or ſpeaking: which things beeing dedes and no qualities, the foreſayde rule maye ſeeme vntrue:

41 It may be anſwered, that the lykelyneſſe ſtandeth not in the action it ſelfe properly and in very dede: but in the maner of doing, which is referred to the ſtore houſe of qualitie.

42 For the murtherer and the hangman doe both kill and committe one generall action: yet the maner of doing in them is diuers, whiche cauſeth the one to be guiltie, and the other guiltleſſe.

43 For it is not the dede, but the maner of doing, that maketh the cryme.

Of Respecting vvoordes. Chapter. 5.

1 Respecting woordes be of two sortes, some are called respecting woords properly: some are termed respectyng woordes in parte.

2 Respecting woords, properly so called, are two yokefelowes, whose nature and being is, the one to depende and haue his beeing vppon the other, as a husbande, a wyfe, a maister, a seruaunt.

3 Respecting woords in part depend not so straightly eche vpon other, that of force they must bee and cease to be both at once: but the one may be though the other were not at all: as knowledge and knowable:

4 For though there were no reasonable creature in the whole woorld, (which thing presupposed there could be no knowledge) yet should many things remain to bs knowen, whiche maye be termed, and are in deede, knowable.

5 Though one husbande haue manye wyues: one father, manye sonnes and daughters: one frend, many frendes: one king,

king, many kingdomes: yet these beeing many in number, beare no other respect to their yokefellowes, nor their yokefellowes to them, then if they were but one a peece.

6 For he is as wel a husband, a father, a frende, a king, that hathe but one wyfe, one chylde, one frende, one kingdome, as he that hath neuer so many: so that many and fewe in this case, haue all one respect in reason.

The propreties of respecting wordes.

1

7 Respecting wordes properly so called are and ceafe to bee bothe at once: but respecting wordes in parte doe not so.

2

8 He that knoweth and is able to saye what one of the respecting wordes is: muste of force knowe and be able to saye what the other is also.

3

9 There are degrees in some respecting wordes, but not in all:

For one man beeing lyke to many

men, may be lyker to one man than to an other: but one father can be no more, nor no lesse a father to one chylde than to an other.

4

11 Some also haue cõtraries, some none at all, as bondage is contrary to libertie; riches to pouertie; but single, double, three folde, father, mother, and suche lyke, haue no contraries at all.

5

12 Respecting wordes depende and hange eche vppon other: and so that one of them is not afore or after an other in tyme.

13 In this storehouse are placed al wordes that signifie any comparison or proportion, any equalnesse, or vnequalnesse, any lykelynesse or vnlykelynesse, anye office or officer, anye cause or effecte, anys whole, or any parte, any ende, or meanes tending to anye ende, anye age, any degree, anye diuersitie of kynde, anye kinrede or affinitie, any societie or fellowshippe, and other moe in manner infinite.

14 If

14 If ye doubte in what ſtorehouſe to place any word, the ſureſt way is to place it here.

15 For many kynds and kinreds which conſidered by them ſelues alone, are to be placed in ſome other ſtorehouſe, may (vpon reſpect had with others) be alſo right well aſſigned vnto this.

Of dooing and ſufferyng.
Chapter. 6.

1 Dooing and ſufferyng are reſpectyng words, and differ not in matter, but in reſpecte.

2 For they bothe are but one mouyng; whiche conſidered as a thing being in the inholder from whence it commeth, is called a dooing: But if the ſame mouing or action be referred to the inholder whyche receyueth it, then it is called a ſuffering. For example thus.

3 The murtherer and the murthered, cõmunicate in one mouing or deed: which deed or mouing conſidered as it commeth from the murtherer, is an action or doing: But conſydered as it is receyued of the

thing that is murthered, it is a suffering.

4 Of this it is playne, that doing is a mouing, proceeding from the doer: and suffering is a mouing receyued of the sufferer.

Of the propreties of dooing and suffering.

1

5 Doing and suffring are both at once, and one is not afore nor after an other.

2

6 Doing and suffering are in two byuers inholders: yet may two bodies meeting togither in one acte, be bothe doers and bothe sufferers at once: as when two suppes doe pushe together, eyther putting force vnto other, and eyther receyuyng force from other.

7 They admitte degrées of more and lesse: and some haue contraries, and some haue not.

Of the two Storehouses, VVhere, and VVhen. Chapter. 7.

1 Where and when, differ from place and tyme, for that they haue alwayes respect

ſpecte vnto ſome matter that was mentioned afore: where as time and place are knowen and deſined as they are conſidered by themſelues, without reſpect had to any other thing.

2 For if any man ſhould heare one ſaye where? (no talke had afore hand) he would ſtraight way thinke with him ſelf, where what? loking for ſome perſon, fact or matter, that he might appoynt to ſome place, thereby to aunſwere the queſtion.

3 Therefore where, is not a place but a declaring of things which ſhal be, are, or haue bene in place.

4 And when, is not a time, but a ſhewing of things done or to be done in time.

How, vvhere and vvhen, are deuided.

5 As time and place are deuided, ſo are where and when.

6 Tyme is deuided into tyme to come, time preſent, and time paſt.

7 It may alſo be many other wayes deuided, by reaſon of the manifold varietie of matters that chaunce in it.

8 As the time of warre, & time of peace,

the time of dearth, the tyme of plenty, the tyme of sickneſſe, the time of health, the time of shutting in the doores, the tyme of opening of the doores.

9 Furthermore, spring, summer, harueſt, winter, are seuerall seasons and tymes of the yeare.

10 Likewise a minute, an hour, a day, a weeke, a moneth, a yeare, an age, a world, are common wordes, vsed of men to note and set forth particular times.

11 There are fiue differences of place, as aboue, beneath, on the right side, on the left side, afore, and behind.

12 These are two wayes taken, eyther as they are placed in respecte to vs warde: or els as they are appoynted by nature.

13 Although aboue and beneath: on the ryghte syde, and on the lefte: afore, and behynd: in respect tovs warde, bee not alwayes one and the same, but alter as wee are altered: yet in nature they are alwayes certayne.

14 For aboue, by nature is that whereunto light things ascend.

15 Beneath

15 Beneath, that where vnto heauye things descend.

16 The right syde, which is toward the West.

17 The left side, which is toward ỳ East.

18 Afore, which is towarde the South.

19 Behind, which is toward the North.

20 For trees and plantes haue heles, which whiles they growe in the earth, are alwayes toward the North.

21 Aboue and beneath, are the begynninges of length: the right side, and the lefte syde, are the beginnings of breadth: afore and behind, are the beginninges of thickneſſe.

22 Places are thus deuided, some are naturall, some artificiall, some fained, some neare, some farre of: some holy, some prophane: some common, some priuate: some healthful, some contagious: some fertill, some bareu: some hote, some colde, some temperate.

23 There are manye other deuisions of time and place, and they in maner infinit: but of theſe fewe anye meane wit maye with eaſe finde outs manye moe to ſerue

his

his purpose as he shal be occasioned.

Of the ninth Storehouse, called Placing. Chap. 8.

1 This Storehouse conteineth al words that signifie any placing, setting, or ordering of a thing, as to hang, to sit, to lye, to bowe, to bend, to compasse, to mowe, to sheare, to frowne, to be scattered, to be imbaulmed, to be inrolled. &c.

2 Here is to be noted, that frowning taken for a mouing, is an action: but beyng taken for the browes knit and drawne together, it is a placing.

3 Words placed in this Storehouse, haue no contraries at all, some admit degrees of more and lesse, and some do not.

Of the tenth Storehouse called hauing. Chap. 9.

1 Some take hauing onely for an apparelling, howbeit, it is much more largely taken.

2 As for an apparelling, it is but eyther when one thyng is hanged vpon another, as when a horse is trapped,

3 Or when one thing is set to another, as when a shaft is fethered,

4 Or els when one thing compasseth an other in part, or in whole, as when one is ringed or armed.

5 But hauing, is of anye thing whatsoeuer, whether the thing had be a substance a quantitie, a qualitie, or els referred to any other of the Storehouses, or of things exempted out of the Storehouses. habitus.

6 And therfore this storehouse teacheth vs not so muche to consider the nature of the thinges that are had: as to marke what commeth of the hauing of suche and such things.

7 Many men thinke, that many wordes placed in this Storehouse, admit degrees of more and lesse: and that some haue contraryes also.

8 Because it is commonly said that some men are better monyed then others, better frended, better weapned: and that this man is armed, and that man vnarmed: that he is frended, and he lord.

9 Howbeit, if the matter bee throughly sifted, the increase and the contrarietie

standeth not in the hauing of these things: but in the things that are had.

10 Though euery plain meaning worde haue his proper place in some one Storehouse alone: yet may the same indirectly & after a sort be also referred to some other.

11 As a father is properlye a respecting worde: but indirectly he may be taken for a substaunce, because a father is a man, which is properly a substaunce.

12 The cause is, for that thinges which directly pertein to an inholder, are some tymes in common speach indirectly sayde of hys inheer.

13 And againe, such thinges as properly belong to some inheer: are sayde of hys inholder.

14 So we saye, a lyne is an inholder of straightnesse: yet indirectly, for directly a bodyed substaunce, is the proper inholder of straightnesse, and not a line.

That Storehouses helpe to inlarge a matter, and that euerye worde may after a sorte be deduced through them all.

15 The

15 The Storehouses serue: not onely to teache vs the force and nature of eche plaine meanyng woord, as whether it doth signifye a substaunce, a quantitie, a qualitie, a respect &c.

16 But they serue also to amplifie and to set forthe a matter at large, and then they teache vs to seeke the substaunce, the quantitie, the qualitie, the respect, the place, the tyme, the ordering and the hauing of the thing wee speake of, and so to deduce one woorde throughe all the Storehouses. Which though it bee properly placed in some one: yet indirectlye and after a sorte, it maye be deduced and brought through them all.

Woordes exempted out of the Storehouses. Chap. 10.

1 These nyne kinde of woords followinge, are exempted out of the Storehouses, as not properly placed in any one of them.

1

2 The woords of art inuented to expresse y rules of any scięce, as a nown, a pronown, a verbe,

a verbe, &c, a forelet, a backlet, a shewe say, &c.

2

3 Unperfite woordes, which by themselues teach the hearers no matter, but serue onely, to helpe to furnishe out a sentence, and to make it perfite, as, or, if, and, &c.

3

4 Woordes that signifie lacke or want of any natural power, as, dumbnesse, deafenesse, darkenesse, &c.

4

5 Woordes that signifie matters which are not in deede, but are fayned to be, as Pobthrus, rawhed, purgatorie.

5

6 Woordes that signifie a parte of any whole thing, as an hand, a foote, a legge, an arme: so long as they remaine partes not seuered from their whole.

6

7 God for that he is infinite, and not able to be comprehended of any thing, howbeit some men doe iudge him to be a most perfect substaunce.

8 Woordes

7

8 Wordes that signifie all things without destinction, as a thyng, a matter, a whatsicallit.

9 The Storehouses are called generall wordes, for that they containe many, but these may be termed surmounting generalls, because they containe all.

8

10 Two or moe wordes expressing matter that is contained in diuers Storehouses, as a white horse a righteous man.

11 For white and righteous are placed in one Storehouse: and man and horse in another.

9

12 Wordes of double vnderstanding: for these afore they bee restrayned to one saywhat, maye haue place in diuers Storehouses: and therefore vnfit to be assygned to one.

Howv vvordes of double vnderstanding maye be knovven.

Chap. 11.

1 What like sounding wordes are, and

13 And here it is sometimes good to consider the sayd whattes of wordes as they are defined and set forth whē they are coupled and ioyned with other wordes.

14 For taking so much awaye from the sayd whattes, as is proper to ech worde annexed to the originall: the rest in all the sayd whattes, must be one and the same.

15 For example thus: if ye ioyne to this word cleare, aire, and voyce, defining a cleare aire, and a cleare voyce severally: and then after take so muche from either sayd what, as properly apperteyneth to aire and voyce: the rest that remayneth in both the sayd whattes, shal be one, if cleare were a plaine meaning word.

16 Howe the thing that remaineth is not one, and therefore cleare is diuersly taken.

17 For a cleare voyce is a voyce pleasant to the eare, wythout horsenesse, or iarring.

18 But a cleare aire, is an aire voyde of cloudes: so that voice, and aire, taken from these two sayd whattes, the rest that remaineth is not one in them both.

19 For

19 For pleasant to the eare, and wythout horsenesse or iarring, is a thing dissenting muche from that which is voyd of cloudes.

20 By these meanes and suche lyke, wordes are proued to bee of double understanding,

Of disagreeable vvordes. Chap. 12.

1 Wordes which cannot be coupled and ioyned together in a true & perfect yeasay, are either differing wordes, or gainsettes.

2 Differing wordes, are those whereof one differeth from many, in lyke manner and sort.

3 Gaynsettes are two disagreeable words wherof the one so setteth fote against the other, as against no other thyng in lyke sort: in so muche that neither the one can be affirmed of the other: neither they both of any third thing, at one time, and in one respecte.

4 These gaynsets are deuided into foure sortes: into contrarye termes, respectyng terms, depriuing terms, & denying terms.

5 What contrarie termes and respecting termes are: we haue said afore.

priuatiua. 6 Depriuing termes are taken in this place, not onelye for woordes that note a want of naturall power: but for waute and power compared together, as Lighte, Darknesse.

contradictoria negantia 7 In lyke manner denying termes are taken, both for the yeawoord, which affirmeth: and also for the naywoord, which denyeth: as a man, no man: a stone, no stone.

8 Here is to be noted that the naywoord, which is infinite, conteyneth all thinges, saue his yeaward, which hath his limitation and is certain, and as they both are said of no one thing, so the one of them is verified of euery thing.

VVhat difference there is betvvene depriuyng termes and contrarye termes.

9 Depryuing termes differ from contrary termes which haue no meane, for that the one of such contrary termes, must at all tymes be in his inholder; where as the

the depriuing termes, may for a tyme bee both absent.

10 I meane the time, afore power commeth to the inholder by nature.

11 Now from contrarye termes whych haue a meane, they differ in this;

12 For that there is a time appointed by nature, when as the one of the depriuing termes must of force bee laide of bys inholder: but of contraryes which haue a meane, there is at no tyme anye suche necessitie.

13 For example thus. After nyne dayes that a bitch hathe whelped, hir whelpes must of force either see or bee blinde: but afore the time be expired that nature hath set and appoynted that whelpes shoulde see in, ye can not ryghtlye saye that the whelpes are either blind or do see.

14 As for white, and blacke, which are contraryes that haue a meane, they haue no suche force in a whelpe at anye tyme, that the one muste bee in it, and the other from it,

15 Bicause the whelpes may at all times be of some other meane colour.

Howe many wayes one thing is said to be afore or after another.

Chap. 13.

1 The first and principall way that one thing is sayde to bee afore another, is, in tyme.

2 For that which is more auncient, is said to be afore that, which had his being in a latter season.

3 As, King Henry the eight, was in time afore King Edward the first.

4 The second way that one thing is said to bee afore another, is, by nature: as when the being of the latter, inforceth, a being of the former, but contrarywise, the sequele of the former, shall not inferre a necessary sequele of the latter.

5 The kynd and the kinred, the genere and the special, are fit examples to teache the meaning of this rule.

6 For if there be a man here, it followeth of force, that the same bee a wight: but the sequele on the contrarye parte, is not good: that if there be a wight here, the same should be a man.

7 For

7 For there are many wightes whiche are no men.

8 Therefore we holde, that the generall is in nature afore the speciall, and that Iohn, William, and other seuerall men, muste firste be substances, creatures, bodies, and wightes, afore they come to be men.

9 The third way that one thing is said to be afore an other, is, when things goe one afore an other in order: as letters are lerned afore syllables, and syllables afore words: substance is placed afore a quantitie, and quantitie afore qualitie.

10 The fourth waye that one thing is sayde to be afore an other, is, when one thyng passeth and exceedeth an other in worthynesse: as the king is afore his subiect in honoure: the maister afore his seruant, by estimation:

11 For that the King and the mayster, passe and exceede, the subiect and the seruant, in worthinesse.

12 Of this it is cleare, that one thyng is sayde to be afore an other foure manner of wayes: as,

Afore in
1 tyme.
2 nature.
3 order.
4 worthynesse.

13 After, is so many wayes taken as afore is.

14 For gaynsettes bene lyke trade in teaching: and he that knoweth one gaynset, must nedes know the other.

Of the beeing of things at once. Chapter. 14.

1 Those things are most properly sayd to be at once, whiche are done, or haue their being, bothe at one tyme.

2 As twinnes are bothe at once: or as the Eclipse of the Sunne and the direct placing of the Mone, betweene our sighte and it, are bothe at once.

3 In nature those things are sayd to be at once, which are suche as the being of the one, followeth vppon the being of the other, and yet neyther of them cause of others being.

4 As a husbande and a wyfe, a double part,

parte, and an halfepart, are bothe at once by nature.

5 For if there be a wyfe, then is there a husbande: and if there be a husbande, then is there a wyfe.

6 Againe, if there be a thing that is a double part: then is there a thing, that is an halfe part to that double.

7 And yet is an husband no more cause of the beeing of a wyfe, then a wyfe cause of the beyng of an husband: nor a double parte any more the cause of an half part, then an halfe parte is cause of a double parte.

8 Membres of one diuysion are also sayd to be all at once, as,

9 Man and beaste beyng membres of one deuisyon, are supposed by Nature to bee bothe at once, and one of them not to be afore or after an other.

10 But a man and a wight are not both at once, in the respect of nature.

11 Because a wighte is mannes generall, and Nature alwayes supposeth the generall, to be afore his specials.

Of

Of mouing. Chap. 14.

1 Moning is not only taken for the paſſing of a bodied ſubſtaunce from place to place: but mouyng is alſo taken for the begetting or corrupting of a ſubſtance: for the increaſing or diminiſhing of a quantitie: or elſe for the altering of a qualitie.

2 Begetting or ingēdring is a mouing, making that to bee in deede, whiche afore was but in power to be.

3 Corrupting is a mouing, cauſing that thing not to bee whych afore had a beeing.

4 Begetting and corruptyng are but one mouing, conſidering the acte in it ſelf, being in deed but one act, and done at once.

5 They differ, onely in reſpecte of the ſundrye bodyes, whereunto they are referred.

6 For whatſoeuer is corrupted, is corrupted into ſome thing, that ſucceedeth in his place:

7 And whatſoeuer is ingendred or begotten, ariſeth of ſome thing, which ceaſeth to be, that the other may ſucceede in his rome. For example thus:

8 In the burning of wood or any other matter,

matter, thys acte referred vnto the wood that is burned, is called a corrupting: for it taketh away the wood, and causeth it to haue no longer a being in nature.

9 But if you referre the selfe same act of burning, vnto the smoke, flame, & ashes that arise of the wood, when it is consumed by fire: it is called an ingendring or begetting.

10 Nowe loke howe the wood consumeth by little and little: and so doe ashes, smoake, and flame, arise and spring.

11 So that a man may playnly see, that as one substance passeth away, and is cõsumed to naughte: an other substaunce springeth vp, and succedeth in his rome.

12 And agayne, as one substance commeth vp and is begotten, an other substance ceasseth to be, and makes (as a mã would say) rome for it: For else it coulde not haue any being in nature at all.

13 Ther is no space or distance of time, betwirt begetting, and corrupting: neither is the one of them before, or after an other, but both at once, euen at one instant and moment of time.

14 I

14 If this were not, ye should bée forced to graunte, that eyther two bodyes myghte bée in one place at once: or elle that there were a place in nature vtterly voyde of any bodie at all.

15 For whē a new thing is made, which must fill a place by it self, and no former thing taken awaye to make rowme for it: ther must be either a voyd place in nature to receiue it: or elle there must be two bodies in one place at once, that whiche is newly made, and that which was afore.

16 Nowe neyther of these two wayes can be, as wée may learne by many experimentes.

17 Therfore it followeth of necessitie, that the bringing in of a newe bodie into the frame of nature, is a taking awaye of some former body, whiche had a beeing in the same frame afore.

18 Increasing is a mouyng that causeth a greater quantitie: and diminishing that causeth a lesse.

19 Altering is a chaunging from qualitie to qualitie: as when a man chaungeth from vertue to vice.

20 Pa-

20 Many men do hold an opinion, that nothyng can be increased or diminished in quantitie: but that the same doth withall admitte an alteration of qualitie, a chaunge of place, and an ingendring of substaunce.

21 Howebeit experience doth teach the contrarie.

22 For a square iuste compassyng the two sydes of a foursquare platte, augmenteth the quantitie, and nothyng alvereth the forme thereof.

23 Lykewyse, when things are altered in any qualitie, they are not of force withall, eyther increased or diminished: ingendred or corrupted: or else moued from place to place.

24 The forme of a square in numbres is this, ⁘ in bigger this ▦

25 The forme of a foursquare platte in numbres is this, ⁙ in bygger, thys, ▦

26 Mouing in oure Englishe tongue is most properly, and in maner altogither taken for mouing in place, so that it being

but

but a parte, boroweth in our speache, the name of hys whole: for that it hathe no speciall name of his owne, as other particular mouings haue.

Of contrarietie in mouing.

27 Generally, rest is contrarie to mouing: but particularly begetting is contrarie to corrupting: and increasing to diminishing: and mouing in place, to resting in place: or else mouing vpwarde contrarie to mouing downeward.

28 And as for alteration which is a mouing in qualitie, it hath eyther rest from suche a mouing, to bee his contrarie: or else a chaunge into a contrarie qualitie.

The

The ſecond boke of VVitcraft.

Chap. 1.

IN our former boke we haue intreated of the Steyshouſes, ſhewing the nature and diſtinction of wordes, and began wyth that wherch was the ſmalleſt part, and portion of this arte.

2 It followeth nowe in due order, that from wordes we proceede to intreate of ſayings, for that ſayings are immediatlye framed of wordes.

3 Both wordes and ſayings are meanes to expreſſe the thoughtes of the minde: but ſayings expreſſe the thoughts of the mind, as matter is coupled to matter: and wordes expreſſe the thoughtes of the minde without anyioyning of thyngs togethet at all.

4 Thoughtes of the minde, and matters whereof men ble to ſpeake and to write, be in all countryes one and the ſame in kind: but letters and the voyce whereby ſuche thyngs are vttered, are not.

VVhat a saying is.

5 A saying is a voyce whose seuerall partes do by consent signifie some matter.

6 I saye by consent, for that euery language or speache groweth by consent, and is learned by imitating and followyng of others: neither is there any tonge gyuen naturally to man without a teacher, as weeping and laughing are.

That there are diuers kyndes of sayinges, and vvhich of them are proper to this arte.

7 There is a perfect saying, and an vnperfect saying.

8 A perfect saying maketh a perfect sense of it self, as, man is mortall.

9 An vnperfect saying causeth the hearer to looke for more wordes to make vp a full meanyng, as, man mortall.

10 Agayne a perfecte saying is deuided into three sortes, into a shewsaye, a bidsaye, and a wishsaye.

11 In the firste we shewe or declare, in the

the seconde wee bid or commaunde, in the third wee wyshe or desire things to be or not to bee.

12 For example thus: John commeth hether, is a shewsaye: come hether John, a bidsaye: I wolde John came hether, a wishsaye.

13 Of these the shewsaye onelye appertayneth to thys arte, for it onely maye be true or false.

Of the Shewsay, and firste what a shewsaye is.

Chap. 2.

1 A shewsaye is a perfecte saying standing of a nowne and a shewing verbe.

The matter of a shewsay.

2 A nowne and a verbe are the matter wherof a shewsay doth stand.

Of a Nowne.

3 A nowne is a voyce signifying some thing by consent, & noting besids no difference of tyme, whose partes severally taken, signifie no matter: as a mā, an herbe,

an house, vertue, righteousnes. &c.

4 As for letters and syllables, they signifie a sounde onely, and doe not further importe any matter.

5 An houre, a day, a moneth, a yeare, doe lymit and appoynte tymes: but yet they note no difference of tyme, as the Verbe doth, who euer includeth either tyme presente, tyme past, or tyme to come, which are ryghtlye called the differences of tyme.

Of a Verbe.

6 A Verbe is a worde notyng some difference of tyme, vnto the which if yee adde a nowne in fitte order, there dothe arise a perfect vnderstandyng, as, is, was, shalbe.

Of the forme of a shewsay, and vvhat appertayneth to the perfecte knowledge therof.

7 Two thyngs appertayne to the forme of a shewsay then to the matter.

8 For to the forme it appertayneth to con-

conſider whether the ſhewſaye be ſimple or compounded, one or manye: ſecondlye whether it bee a ſhewſaye of the fyrſte order or of the ſeconde: thyrdlye, howe the backeſet agreeth or diſagreeth wyth the foreſette: fourthlye, how the one of them maye bee changed into the roume or place of the other: fiftlye, which ſhewſaye is generall, whyche ſpeciall: 6, which affirmeth whyche denyeth: 7, which is true, which is falſe: 8, which is an impoſſible ſhewſaye, whych is a neceſſarye ſhewſaye, and whych is a chaunceable ſhewſaye: 9, what gaynſettes eche ſhewſaye hathe: 10, whyche bee ſhewſayes of lyke force and ſtrength.

VVhich is a ſimple shevvſaye and one and vvhiche is a compounded shevvſay and many.

9 A ſymple ſhewſaye ſtandeth of one Verbe: as man is mortall. A compounded ſhewſaye of manye: as if you marry my Daughter I make you myne heire: or impoſſible it is, that a ſtone ſhoulde haue feelyng.

10 Often times in a shewsaye one verbe is but once spoken: and yet the meaning of the same shewsaye requireth the same verbe to bee diuers times understande: such a shewsaye is compounded, and not one, but manye.

11 For, Iohn and William are riche and in health, is not one shewsaye, but manye: for it is as muche to saye, as Iohn is riche: Iohn is in health: William is riche: William is in health.

12 First wee will intreate of a simple shewsay, and after of a compounded shewsay, in his proper place and order.

Of the two orders of a simple shewsaye.

13 There are two orders of a simple shewsaye: a shewsaye of the first order, sheweth onely the being or not being of a thing, as, man is, or, man is not.

14 A shewsaye of the second order, affirmeth or denyeth one thyng of another, as, man is iust: man is not iust.

15 A shewsay of the first order, standeth euer but of one nowne and one verbe: a shewe-

shewesaye of the seconde order, of twoo nownes and one verbe, one alwayes placed afore, and another after the verbe.

Of the foresets and backsets that are in a simple shewvesaye. Chap. 3.

1 The foreset is a nowne placed afore the verbe, and the backset after, as, man is iuste: man is the foreset, and iust, is the backeset.

2 Sometymes a whole sentence or a clause of a sentence is a backset, or a foreset: as to rise earely is a holesome thing: in this shewsay, to rise earely, is the foreset, and a holesome thing is the backsette, they both supplying the rowme and office of an nowne.

To vvhat vse foresettes and backesettes serue.

3 The forehouses serue to shew the nature of woordes as they are taken and considered by themselues alone.

4 The foreset & backset of a shewsay declare the respecte that woordes haue one to

an other, as they are coupled and linked together in a perfect saying.

To knowe what respecte the backset hath to the foreset in euery simple shewsaye of the seconde order.

5 If the backset bee deuided and parted asunder from the foreset by a naysay, then doth it but eyther differ from it, or els it is a gainset to it.

6 What differing wordes and gaynsets are, we haue shewed afore in the .12. Chapter of the first booke.

7 If it be affirmed & coupled to the foreset by a yeasay: then muste the foreset and backset be such as either may be saide of other turne for turne, or not saide.

8 If either may be said of other turne for turne, then is the one of them the kindred, and the other his saywhat: or els one the kindred and the other his propertie.

9 For onelye the saywhat and the propertie compared to the kindred, maye bee said of it, and it of them, turne for turne: but the saywhat expresseth what the kin-

dred

vsed is, and the propretie doth not.

10 If the backset be sayd of the foreset, and the foreset can not be said in lyke sort of it agayn: then is the backset to be reckened, eyther in the number of these thinges, that are vsed to be placed in the sayewhat of the foreset, or not vsed to be placed there.

11 If the backsette be in the number of those that are vsed to be placed in the saywhat of the foreset: then is it either ỳ kind or the difference: for a saywhat standeth of these two.

12 If the backset be sayd of the foreset, and be neyther his sayewhat, propretie, nor difference: then is it an Inheer.

13 For that we count an Inheer, which being in a thing, is neyther his saywhat, propretie, kinde, nor difference.

Of a sayvvhat, and of things that are handled and intreated of in lyke maner that it is. Chap. 4.

1 A saywhat is a saying, shewing what a thing is, as man is a wighte, indued

with sense and reason.

2 Those that make declaration of any thing by a worde, or by any other meane whatsoeuer commeth to hande, do not by and by giue a perfect saywhat, of the thing they take in hand to speake of.

3 Yet suche declarations, bicause they are handled and intreated of in like forme and manner, that a saywhat is, are taken in arguing, as a thing that occupieth the roome and place of a saywhat.

4 For he that sayeth the formoste of yonder companie, is the kyng: Or thys citie is Londō: or to behold, is to see: wold seeme after a sorte, to expresse the thyng whereof he speaketh.

Generall rules appertyning to a sayvvhat.

5 Fiue poyntes are to be obserued in a perfect saywhat.

1

6 First, that the saywhat shewe what the kinred is.

2

7 Secondly, that it conteyne neyther more

more nor lesse matter, then it shoulde.

3

8 Thirdely, that it stande of the next kynde, hauing moste proper differences put therto.

4

9 Fourthly, that it be playne.

5

10 Fiftly, that it be breefe.

Of a Propretie. Chapter. 5.

1 A propretie dothe not expresse what the kinred is, as the sayd what dothe: but is sayde of the kinred, and the kinred said of it turne for turne: as eche man is apt to laugh: and eche thyng apte to laughe, is a man.

2 No man accompteth that for a propretie, whyche is in any other thing than in one kinred: or whych chaunceth to be in one kindred, but for a tyme.

3 If any suche thyng be sayde to bee a propretie, it is not properly so to be taken: but a propretie for a tyme, or in respect of an other: and thus there are foure sorts of proprties.

4 Some

1

4 Some appertaine to one kindred alone, though not to all the selfe things of that kindred: as to be cunning in physike, pertayneth only to man, but not to eache man.

2

5 Some appertayne to eche selfe thing of one kinred: and yet not to that kinred alone: as to haue two eyes appertayneth to all men, but not only to man.

3

6 Some appertayne to one kindred alone, and to eche selfe thing of that kinred: but not at al tymes: as to ware grayheaded in age, appertayneth only to man, and to eache man that is aged, but not at all tymes.

4

7 Some apertain to one kinred alone, to eche self thing of that kinred, and at all tymes: As fælyng appertaineth only to a wyghte, to eche wyghte, and at all tymes. And thys is moste properly called a proprietie.

VVhy

VVhy vvee intreate in this place of selfe thinges and kinreds, and vvhat they are. Chap. 6.

1 Many selfe things make a kinred, and many kinreds, a kinde. Therfore to prosæde by order from the lesse to the more, wee here interlace the treatise of self thinges and kinreds.

Of selfe things.

2 A selfe thing is that whiche is sayd but of one sole thing alone: as London, England, this man, or this horse.

3 Selfe things are not properly handeled of any arte, but so far as they are contayned in some kinred or kinde.

4 For arte intreateth of general matters: as physicke teacheth not to cure William, or Robert, but man thus or thus diseased.

Of a kinrede.

5 A kinred is sayde of many, differing but in number onely, and answerable when demaunde is made, what self things are.

6 Or thus, a kinred is that, whyche is contained of a kinde, or whereto a kynde is

is answerable, when it is demanded what a kinred is.

7 The first of these saywhats appertayneth to the lowest kinred: the other two saye whattes appertayne to a large kinred.

8 The lowest kinred is next vnto selfe things, and euer called a kinred, whether it be compared to selfe things that are vnder it: or to the kynde that is aboue it.

9 A large kinred is that whiche hath other kinreds vnder it, and maye be taken both for a kinred (as it is referred to the kind that is aboue it:) or for a kynd (as it is sayde of kinreds that are vnder it.)

10 For example thus: A wight is a large kinred, for it hathe vnder it, a man, and a beast, whiche are kinreds them selues: so that if ye referre a wighte to a substance then is it a kinred: but when ye referre a wight to a man, or a beast, then is it a kynde conteynyng many kinredes of wyghtes vnder it.

Of a Kynde. Chapter. 7.

A kynde is that whyche is sayde

many kinreds, and answerable when it is demaunded what kinreds are.

2 As a wight is a kynd, for it is sayd of man and beast, which are many kinreds.

3 And if it be demaunded what a man or a beast is, ỹ answere ought to be made, man is a wight, or a beast is a wight.

4 There is a generall kinde and a speciall kynde.

5 A generall kynde is that whiche is taken always for a kynd, as ever referred to that which is under it: such are the ten generall wordes called storehouses.

6 A speciall kynde is that which may be both a kynd, and a kinred: as a wighte is a kinde, referred to a man: but referred to a creature, it is a kinred.

7 The thing that is placed in any storehouse, is in that respect alwayes, either a selfe thing, a kinred, or a kinde.

8 Selfe things are sayd but of one: kinred, and kyndes of many.

9 All kinreds are specialls, which lye betwixte the lowest kinred and the generall kinde.

10 We must neuer by alleging amount

aboue

aboue the generall kinde: neyther by descending fall beneath the lowest kinred.

11 For selfe thynges to vs are infinite, and do not belong to arte, but are iudged by sense: And by surmountyng generals we are not taught.

12 For they contayne all things without distinction.

Of a difference. Chap. 8.

1 A difference is a marke whereby one thing is discerned from an other.

How differences are deuided.

There are three sortes of differences, a common difference, a proper difference, and a most proper difference.

3 A common difference is a remouable marke, whereby a thing differeth from it selfe, or from some other thing, by any maner of meanes.

4 A proper difference is an inseparable marke (chaunceable notwithstanding) whereby one thing differeth from another.

5 A most proper difference is that which is

is that whiche is sayde of many differing in kinred, when we demaunde whatkin a one, a thing is.

6 This difference is eyther taken in a sayewhat to shewe what a kinred is: or in a diuision to deuide a kynde.

7 A difference differeth from a propretie, for a proprtie is sayde but of one kinred: and a difference of many kinreds.

8 One worde according to diuers respects, may be both a difference, and a propretie: as seeling referred to a wight, is a proprtie: and compared to a man, it is a difference.

Of an Inbeer. Chap. 9.

1 An Inbeer is that which may be or not be in one selfe inholder.

How inbeers are deuided.

2 There are two sortes of inbeers, one remoueable, the other vnremoueable.

3 A remoueable Inbeer may in deede be seuered from hys inholder: as knowledge from a man.

4 An vnremoueable inbeer maye in

thought, but not in dæde be seuered from his inholder: as blacknesse from a crowe, and heate from fire.

Of the tourning of a shewsay. Chapter. 10.

1 The tourning of a shewsay is the remouing of the backset into the rome of the foreset.

2 There is a right tourning of a shewsay and a wrong tourning.

3 A shewsay is rightly tourned when as both are necessarily true: but if when ye haue tourned a shewsay, the one shewsay be false, and the other true: then is the shewsay tourned amisse.

4 Agayne a shewsay is rightly tourned two ways: either when the signe doth remayne, whether it be generall or particular: or else when the generall signe is rebated into the particular.

5 The generall naysay, and the particular yeasay are rightly turned, whē their signes and marks remayne: as no man is a stone, and no stone is a man: or some mē

are

are apte to swim, and some things apte to swim are men.

6 The generall yeasay is not rightly tourned, but when the generall signe is rebated into the particular: as all men are creatures: and some creatures are men.

7 The particular naysay, is not of force apte to be tourned at all.

8 Because the kinde may be denied of his kinred in parte: but the kinred (being wholly conteyned under the kind) cannot againe be denyed of him in parte.

9 For we may wel say: some creatures are no men: but we can not rightly saye, some men are no creatures.

10 When the backset is a saywhat or a propertie, the generall yeasay is rightly tourned, the generall signe not rebated.

11 As all men are apt to laugh: and all thinges apte to laugh are men, or every man, is a wighte indued with sense and reason: and eche wight indued with sense and reason is a man.

12 These sayings and suche like are thus tourned, not by forces of anye rule

that perteyneth to the turning of a shewsay: but by reason the foreset and backset of suche shewsayes, are termes that may indifferently be sayd eche of other, turne for turne.

Of a yeasay, and a naysay. Chapter. ii.

1 Euery simple shewsay, whether it be of the first order, or of the second order, is eyther a yeasay, or a naysay.

2 A yeasaye of the fyrste order, affyrmethe the beyng of a thyng, as man is.

3 A yeasay of the seconde order, coupleth the backset to the foreset, and affirmeth one thing of an other: as man is a wyghte.

4 A nayesaye of the fyrste order, denyeth a thyng to bee: as, man is not.

5 A naysay of the seconde order, denyeth a thing to be this or that: as, man is not an angell.

Of the quantitie of a shewsay: Chapter. 12.

1 The quantitie of a shewsaye dependeth onely vpon the forese.

2 For as the forset is generally, or particularly taken: so is the shewsay either a generall or a particular saying.

3 If the forese be a sole worde, then is the shewsaye singular: as London is a Citie.

4 But if the forsette bee a common worde, then hathe it, eyther an vniuersall signe before it, and is called an vniuersall shewsay: as, all men are creatures: or else a particular signe, and is called a particular shewsay: as, some men are learned: or else it hath no signe at all, and then it is called an vndetermined shewsay: as, man is mortall.

5 The singular and vndetermyned shewsayes, are allwayes taken in a reason, as particulars.

6 No shewsay is true, whers the backset beeing a common worde, hath an vniuersall signe ioyned vnto it: as, All men

are all creatures: or men are al creatures.

7 But in a singular shewsay it may: as, these men are all the frendes, I haue.

Of signes and marks which shewe the quantitie and qualitie of eche shewetay. Chapter. 13.

1 There are foure sortes of signes and markes, so termed, because they note the quantitie and qualitie of euery shewsay.

a { Generall yeamarke, Generall naymarke, Particular yemarke, Particular naymark } as { all, none, some, some not }

2 The particular naymarke is commonly expressed in oure mother tong, by two wordes, some and not (some other wordes alwayes being placed betwixte them:) for we vse not to saye, some not men are learned: but some men are not learned.

Of

Of a true and a false shewsay.
Chapter. 14.

1 If men do affirme that thing to bee, which is not: or do denye that thing to be, which is: they make a lye, and their shewsay or saying is false.

2 But if that thing be in deede, whiche they affirme to be: or if that thing be not in deede, whiche they denye to be: then is their saying true.

3 So that the truth or falshod of mens sayings, dependeth wholly of the matter, that is uttered by their words.

4 To know whether eche matter fall out according to this or that mans saying, or not: it apperteyneth not onely to Witcraft to decide, but eche saying is tryed to be true, or false, by that arte where unto it doth properly appertaine.

To knowv vvhich is a neceſſarie shevv-ſay, vvhich is an vnpoſsible shevv-ſay, and vvhich is a chance-able shevvſay. Cha. 15.

1 If the backset be a say what, a pro-

pzetie, a kynde, a difference, oz a natu-
rall and an vnremouable Inbær: the
shewsay is necessarie.

2 If the backsette bee a remoueable in-
beer, the shewsay is chaunceable.

3 But if the backset be none of these:
then is it an vnpossible shewsay.

4 A necessarie shewsay differeth from
an vnpossible shewsay: foz that, this is al-
wayes false: and the fozmer alwayes true.

Of gaynsaying shewsayes.
Chapter. 16.

1 Gaynsaying shewsays are two shew-
sayes, the one a yeasaye, and the other a
naysay, chaunging neyther fozeset, back-
set, noz verbe.

2 There are three sortes of gaynsay-
ing shewsays: Contrarie shewsays: lesse
than contrarie shewsays: and moze than
contrarie shewsayes.

3 Contraries are two generall shew-
sayes, the one a yeasaye, and the other a
naysay: as eche man is good: and, no man
is good.

4 Lesse

4 Lesse then contraryes are two particular shewsayes: the one a yeasaye, and the other a naysaye: as some men are good, and some men are not good.

5 More then contraryes are two shewsayes, the one being generall, the other particuler: the one a yeasaye, the other a naysay: as all men are good, and some men are not good: or no man is good, and some men are good. propositiones singulares

6 Contraryes are neuer bothe true: yet chaunceth it sometimes that they are both false: as when the backset is a remoueable inheer: as ethe man is learned, and no man is learned.

7 Lesse then contraryes are neuer both false, but maye in chaunceable shewsayes bee bothe true: as some men are learned, and some are not learned.

8 More then contraryes are most repugnant one to another: for if the one be true, the other of necessitie is false: or if the one bee false, the other of necessitie is true: as all men are learned: and, some men are not learned: or no man is learned, & some man is learned.

Of Shewesayes that are of lyke force. Chap. 17.

1 Those shewesayes are of lyke force and strength which differ in wordes and agree in meaning.

2 It doth properlye pertaine to grammer and not to Witcrafte, to knowe which sayinges agree in sense, and which do not.

3 Yet for so muche as artes are knit together, in such a bande of knowledge, that no man can bee cunning in anye one, but he must haue some knowledge in manye, they vse by vsurpation some times borow one of an other, so muche as doth serue their present purpose.

4 Therfore many writers of Witcraft, intreate in this place, of shewesayes that are of lyke force, onely by reason of this nay word (not) diuerslye placed afore, or after the signes.

5 But here is to be noted, that the same rules hold not in our Englishe tongue ý the

the Latyns vse hereof in their tongue.

6 Therefore take these as certaine: and as for the rest, know that either they are not in vse, or els they holde not in such sort as the Latin authors do appoint.

7 In oure mother tongue wée vse to place this worde (not) eyther onelye afore the sygne: or onely after the signe, as for to place it afore the signe, and after two, in one sentence, it standeth not with the propertie of our speache.

8 (Not) ioyned in a shewesaye, to a generall yeamarke, altereth the qualitie and diminisheth the quantitie thereof, and makes the saying all one, whether it bee placed afore or after the signe.

9 For of a generall yeasay, it makes a particular naysaye: as not all that speake you faire, are your frendes: or all that speake you faire are not your frendes. These two sayinges are both one in sense and meanyng: and as muche to saye as some that speake you fayre are not your frendes.

10 Nowe it is playne that this last sentence is a particular naysay: therefore the

two

two former ſayings, muſte nedes bee ſo to, beyng of like force and value that it is of.

11 If (not) be placed in a ſhewſaye before a perticular yeamarke, it altereth the qualitie, and augmenteth the quantitie thereof, for not one is as muche to ſaye, as none.

12 (Not) beyng placed afore fewe, ſignifyeth manye: and beyng placed afore manye ſignifieth fewe.

13 Foe wayes of placyng of (not) afore the ſigne to make anye good ſenſe in our mother tongue, I finde not.

14 Theſe fewe examples doe ſhewe all in ſmall rome, that is neceſſarye to bee ſpoken of, touchyng this matter.

1 Not all are / All are not	is as	1 ſome are not	
2 Not one is	much	2 none are	
3 Not a fewe	to ſay	3 manye	
4 Not many	as	4 a fewe	

Of a compounded Shewsay. Chap. 18.

1 What a compounded shewsay is, wee haue said afore, fide. 66. verse. 9.

2 There are two sortes of compounded shewsayes.

3 They of the first sort do speake with adding of, if, and, or, cause, or time.

4 They of the second sort, adde the maner of beyng by some one of these foure preambles, as: it chaunceth: it is possible: it is vnpossible: it is necessarye: or els by som other termes of like force, that these: or some one of these is of.

5 A shewsay compounded with, an (if), maye be called an ifsaye, and doth simplelye neither affirme nor denye, but vppon condition, as, if ye doe wel, ye shal be well reported: or if yee doe yll, yee shall not bee well reported.

6 In these two sayings nothing is affirmed simplye or deuided, but vpon condition of well doyng, or yll.

7 A shewsay compounded with (and) is called a coupling shewsay, & this is neuer true,

true, except all partes be true.

8 As Iohn, William, and Robert are learned, is not true: except all partes be true: but false it is, when any parte is vntrue.

9 Also Iohn is learned, discrete and riche: this sayinge is false, if Iohn be eyther not learned, not discrete, or not riche: and true it is not, but when all the thinges recyted, take place in him.

10 A shewsaye compounded with (or) is a parting shewsaye, and is true when any parte is true: and neuer false except all partes be false: as Iohn, Robert, or William, is at home.

11 This is true if any of them be at home: false, when none of them is at home.

12 A shewsay compsunded with adding the cause: as, because you serued faithfully I giue you this forme: and a shewsay compounded with condition of time: as, when I dye you shall haue my land, may well be referred to an assaye: for in affirming and denying, they obserue the same lawe that it doth.

Of

Of Shewsayes compounded by adding the manner of beyng or not beynge. Chap. 19.

1 There are foure Preambles, wherby the maner of being or not being of things, is set forth.

as { it chanceth. / it is possible. / it is vnpossible. / it is necessary.

2 When anye shewesaye hath anye of these preambles put vnto it, then it is called a shewsaye compounded by adding the manner of being, or not beyng.

3 Two things are chiefly to be handled in these compounded shewsayes.

4 The first is to shewe, when they affirme and when they denye: the seconde is to shewe, how they agree and how they follow eche vpon other.

Of

Of the affirming or denying of a Shewsay compounded by adding the manner of beyng or not beyng.

5 Generally they neuer denie, but when this nayworde (not) is placed afore the preamble.

6 For if it bee not put to at all: or elsplaced after the preamble, they affirme.

7 For example, it chaunced that John comming from London, was robbed: the naysaye is, it did not chaunce, that John comming from London was robbed.

8 As for this saying, it chaunced that John commyng from London, was not robbed, is a yeasay: and thus in like maner of the rest.

9 This saying it is vnpossible, for man to flye, is in forme and maner of speaking a yeasay, and in meaning a naysay.

Hovv Shewsayes compounded by adding the manner of being or not being follovv one vpon another.

10 Shewsaies compounded by adding the manner of being, or not beyng folow one vpon another, but not in like sort.

It

It chaunceth to be
1
1 it is possible (to be
2 it is not vnpossible (to be
3 it is not necessary (to be

It chaunceth not to be
2
1 it is possible not (to be
2 it is not vnpossible (not to be
3 it is not necessarye (not to be

hath these following vpon it

It dothe not chance to be
3
1 it is not possible (to be
2 it is vnpossible (to be
3 it is necessarye (not to be

It dothe not chance not to be
4
1 it is not possible (not to be
2 it is vnpossible (not to be
3 it is necessarye (to be

Side. 87. ver. 1

11 For where we afore deuided a shewsay, reckning some to be chanceable, some necessary, some vnpossible, we had respect how the foreset was coupled or not coupled to the backset vpon the sequele of the matter.

12 But here deuiding a shewsaye, into a chanceable shewsay, a possible shewsaye, an vnpossible shewsay, and into a necessarye shewsay, we doe respect the preamble onely for the naming of the shewsay. As for the truth of such sayings, that is to bee considered, as it falleth forth in matter vttered by them.

(.·.)

The thyrd booke of Witcraft.

Chap. 1.

1 WE haue spoke heretofore of words and sayings: it remaineth that we nowe proceede to intreate of a reason.

2 Let vs therefore here set downe those things which are necessarilye required for the due vnderstanding of a perfect reason.

3 First wee will shewe what a reason is: secondlye we will declare how manye kindes of reasons there are: thirdlye wee will lay forth the parts of a reason: fourthly, we will tell howe such partes are to be found out, and how they are to be ordered and disposed, to make a reason that shall inferre a necessary endsaye.

VVhat a reason is.

4 A reason is a compounded shewsaye, prouing that which lyeth in controuersie by knowne and graunted sayings.

5 For euen as certaine woords must be coupled together in due order to make a perfect sentence: so muste certaine sheweſayes be ioyned together in a due frame to make a perfect reason.

That there are but twvo kindes of reasons and what either kind is.

Chapter. 2.

1 There are but two wayes to proue a doubtfull matter.

2 For either we rise by examples of selfe things and specialls, to the knowledge of the generall: or els contrary wise we fall by the rule of the generall, to the knowledge of speciall and selfethings.

3 The first way may be called a reason by example: the seconde a reason by rule.

Examples of a reason by example.

4 If a skilfull Lawyer be the best Lawyer: and a skilfull Mariner the best Mariner: and a skilfull Phisition, the best Phisition: then is he accompted best in eche arte, that hath most skill therin.

5 Another: all light things ascende: for smoke, breath, flame, and fire do so.

6 Here

6 Here are we brought by diuers particulars as by examples, to come to the knowledge of two generall rules.

7 The first rule is, that he is best artificer, that hath most skill in his arte.

8 The seconde is, that all light things ascende.

Of a Reason by rule.

9 A reason by rule, is a reason that standeth of three sheweſayes, framed in suche sorte, that two of them being graunted to be true, the third must by force of them be true also: for example thus.

All light things ascend,
Breath is light,
therefore,
Doth breath ascende.

10 For he that grauteth that all lyghte things do ascend, & also that breth is light, must nedes graunt by force of these, that breath doth ascend too.

VVhat diuersitie there is betvvixt a reason by example, and a reason by rule.

Chapter. 3.

1 A reason by example pertaineth to common sense and experience.

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Chapter. 3.

1 A reason by example pertaineth to common sense and experience.

A reason by rule belongeth to arte.

2 A reason by example serueth to proue the principles of arte, by certaine particular examples: A reason by rule proueth particular cases by principles and generall rules.

3 So that a reason by example ascendeth to the general: a reason by rule descendeth to the particular.

4 A reason by example alloureth the ignorant: a reason by rule forceth the learned.

5 The number of shewesayes in a reason by example are vncertaine, sometimes many, and sometimes feare: but the number of shewesayes in a reason by rule, is euer certaine, and so that they are neuer moe nor leſſe but three.

VVhat things are chiefely to be noted in a reason by rule.

6 There are in a reason by rule (as in eche other thing whatsoeuer) two speciall poyntes to be marked, the matter, and the forme.

Of

Of the matter vvhereof a reaſon by rule is made. Chap. 4.

1 Thꝛée ſhewſayes, and thꝛée termes, are the matter wherof a reaſon by rule is made: but ſhewſayes are nærer, and termes further of.

2 For a reaſon is reſolued into ſhewſayes, and ſhewſayes are reſolued into termes.

VVhat names the three Shevvſayes haue, vvhich are in a reaſon by rule.

3 The two firſt ſhewſayes that are placed in a reaſon by rule, are called forſayes, the third may be termed, an endſay.

4 This is pꝛoued, and they doe pꝛoue.

5 This is firſt in purpoſe, and laſt in oꝛder: they are firſt in oꝛder, and laſt in finding out.

6 When you goe pꝛeciſely to woꝛke, you muſt expꝛeſſe thꝛée ſhewſayes in ech reaſon

ſon that is made by rule: yet men in writing, and common ſpeache, vſe oft to leaue out ſome one of them.

7 When any one is left oute, to knowe which it is: ye ſhall haue a rule for it hereafter.

Of the three termes which are in a reaſon by rule.

8 The three termes that are chiefly to be noted in a reaſon by rule, and whereof the three foreſayd ſhewſayes are made, be thus named: the generall terme: the ſpeciall terme: the prouing terme: eche terme being twice repeted in one reaſon.

the { generall / ſpeciall / prouing } terme.

9 The backſet of the endſay, is alwayes the generall terme.

10 And the foreſet of the endſaye is euer the ſpeciall terme.

11 The prouing term is that terme, which is placed in both the foreſayes: and is the meane whereby the other two termes agree or diſagree among themſelues, in the endſaye.

Of

Of the forme of a reason by rule. Chapter. 5.

1 After ye haue thus generally considered of the matter of a reason by rule: ye must proceede to the forme.

2 Which is in very deede nothing else but a right ordering and disposing of the matter.

3 For it standeth in the right placing of the termes: and in the due quantitie and qualitie of the shewsayes.

4 So that when the three termes are rightly placed in eche shewsay, and when the due quantitie and qualitie of shewsays is kept withal: then is the forme of a reason by rule alwais necessarie, and the endsay is true, by force of the forcsayes.

5 But if either the termes be not rightly ordred, or that the due quantitie & qualitie of shewsayes be not kepte: then the forme of the reason is not good, and that reason it selfe, is in deede, a deceyuable reason.

6 Nowe for the placing of the termes, there are rankes deuised, and for the furnishing of the shewsayes with due quan-

titie & qualitie there are ſeates appoynted.

7 So that the rankes teach where the thꝛée termes are placed in eche ſhewſaye: and the ſeates tel what quantitie and qualitie the thꝛée ſhewſayes muſt haue wherof a reaſon by rule is framed.

8 A ranke is a rew of ſeates, teaching where the thꝛée termes are placed in eche ſhewſaye of a reaſon.

9 A Seate is a ſpeciall forme of arguing, notyng the quantitie and qualitie of eche ſhewſay, which is placed in a reaſon by rule.

10 There are thꝛée rankes oꝛ rewes of ſeates, where all reaſons framed by rule, are couched.

The 1 2 3 ranke.

11 The firſte ranke is a rewe of thoſe ſeates, which euer place the pꝛouing terme betwixt the generall and the ſpecial terme, in ſuche ſoꝛt, that it be vnder the generall, and aboue the ſpecial.

12 The

12 The seconde ranke placeth the proouing terme aboue the general and the speciall terme, so that it is sayde of them bothe.

13 The third ranke placeth the proouing terme beneath them bothe, so that they both are sayde of it.

14 This is further to be marked concerning the ordering of the termes, that the general terme and the proouing terme, make alwayes the fyrst foresaye: the proouing terme and the speciall terme make the seconde foresay: and the generall and the speciall terme make the endsay.

Howe many wayes a reason by rule may bee made.

15 A reason by rule maye be directly framed fouretæne wayes, and mo wayes it can not. Foure ways in the first ranke: and foure wayes in the second ranke: and fyre wayes in the thirde ranke.

16 Now for these fourtæne seuerall fourmes of arguyng, there are fouretæne wordes artificially inuented, eche worde appoin-

appoynted to his proper seate, which parted into three syllables a peece, serue for diuers purposes.

The names of the particular seates, and what is generally to be lerned in eche one of them. Chap. 6.

1 The foure seates which are placed in the first rank, are thus named and ordred.



2 The

2 The foure ſeates that are placed in the ſeconde ranke, are named and ordered thus.

3 The fiue ſeates whiche are placed in the thyrde ranke, are named and ordered thus.

The



4 For clærenelle and memorie ſake, I thinke it good to ſet forth the names of ſes

ſeates, as they are appoynted to their ſeueral rankes, in foure engliſhe verſes.

Proper ſeates appointed for eche ranke.

Barbara, celarent, darii, ferio, to the firſte ranke.
Ceſare, Cameſtres, feſtino, Baroco, darapti: Felapton. Diſamis, datiſi, Bocardo, Feriſon. Dire laſt here downe ſette, be ſeates proper aye to the thirde ranke.

6 Beſides the name of eche particular ſeate, learne alſo of thys that followeth, what matter eche one of theſe artificiall wordes doth include in it ſelfe.

7 Firſte, as eche reaſon by rule ſtandeth of thrée ſhewelayes: So eche ſeate is parted into thrée ſyllables. The firſte ſyllable is ſette agaynſt the fyrſt forelaye, the ſeconde ſyllable agaynſte the ſeconde forelay, the third ſyllable agaynſt the endlaye.

8 The fyrſte and capitall letter of eche worde ſheweth to what ſeate eche vnperfect

perfect reason must be reduced vnto.

9 For the reasons made in the seconde and third ranke, must (or they be accompted perfecte) be reduced to those seates of the first ranke, whiche beginne with the same capitall letter that they doe: as,

Baroco } to Barbara.
Bocardo }

Cesare } to Celarent.
Camestres }

Darapti }
Disamis } to Darii.
Datisi }

Festino }
Felapton } to Ferio.
Ferison }

10 M. p. s. c. shewe how the vnperfecte seates must be reduced.

11 M. noteth, that the forefayes must be chaunged or he into others place.

12 I. noteth a turning of the shewsay, with rebatement of the signe.

13 S.

13 S. Noteth a turning of the shewsay without rebatement of the signe.

14 C. If it be not placed in the first syllable, noteth a reducing of the reason by way of impossibilitie.

15 The vowels note the quantitie and qualitie of eche shewsay: as,

A noteth that the shewsay set a gaynst it, must be a generall yeasay,
E generall naysay,
I particular yeasay,
O particular naysay.

16 The reste of the Letters serue to no purpose, but to make vp the verse.

17 Although this which we haue nowe sayd concerning the matter and forme of a reason by rule, may seme to a pregnant wit, to be sufficient: yet to make the matter playne to beginners, and to those that lackes an instructer: we will declare what manner of theese termes will serue, and howe they must be furnished and set forth with quantitie and qualitie, to make a good reason in euery particular feate, setting forth the same by plaine examples.

Of the first ranke. Chap. 7.

1 To this rank are assigned four seats,

as is afore sayd, in the first seate is concluded a generall yeasaye: in the seconde a generall naysay: in the thyrde a particular yeasay: in the fourth a particular naysaye: So that there is no shewsay which maye not be proued in the seates of the first ranke.

2 The prouing terme in thys ranke, is placed betwixt the generall and the speciall terme.

What maner of termes will serue to make a reason in the fyrste seate of the first ranke.

3 When ye haue three termes, whereof the firste maye wholly be sayde of the seconde, and that the second also may wholly be sayde of the thirde, they do serue to make a reason in Barbara, concluding that the first terme is generally sayde of the thirde: as,

1 Creature	this is ye	general	terme.
2 Wight		proving	
3 Man		speciall	

Cre-



4 If ye will laye forth this reason at large, and furnishe euery shewsay with one quantitie and qualitie, you must vtter it thus.

Bar (All wights are creatures,
ba (All men are wightes, therfore
ra (All men are creatures.

VVhat maner of termes vvil serue to make a reason in the seconde seate of the firste ranke.

5 When ye haue three termes whereof the first is wholly denyed of the second, and the seconde wholly affirmed of the thirde: they serue to make a reason in Celarent, concluding that the firste terme is generally denyed of the thirde: as,

1 Natural
2 lerned by imi-
3 langage (tatiõ)

this is ỹ (general) (proning) (speciall) terms

6 Set this reason downe at large thus

Ce { nothīg lerned by imitatiō is natural
la { euery lāguage is lerned by imitatiō,
{ therfore,
rēt No language is naturall.

What maner of termes will serue to make a reason in the thyrde seate of the firste ranke.

7 When ye haue thre termes whereof the first is wholly affirmed of the second, and the second partly affirmed of the third, they serue to make a reason in Darii, concluding that the first terme is affirmed of the thirde in parte:

1 Cōmendable
2 Vertues
3 Sparing
} this is ỹ { general, prouing, speciall } terme

8 Set

8 Set this reason downe at large thus.

Da — All vertues are commendable
ri — Some kinde of sparing is a vertue
therfore,
j — Some kind of sparing is cõmẽdable

VVhat maner of termes will serue to make a reason in the fourthe seate of the first ranke.

9 When ye haue three termes wherof the first is wholly denyed of the seconde, and the secõd partly affirmed of the third, they serue to make a reason in Ferio: concluding that the firste terme is denied of the thirde in part: as,

1 To be vsed
2 wãton tricks
3 daunces
} this is ỹ { generall / prouing / spetiall } terme



10 Sette this reason downe at large thus.

Fe — No wanton trickeis to be vſed,
ri — Some daunces are wãton tricks,
o — Some daunces are not to be vſed. therfore

11 If the termes wherof you be willed to make a reaſon by rule, beare not ſuche reſpect one to an other, as is ſette forth in theſe foreſayde rules: knowe for a certaintie, that no good reaſon can be made of them: to be placed in the ſeates of the firſt ranke.

12 For when the three termes are ſuch as none can truly be ſayde of an other: or when the firſt is ſayde of the ſeconde but in parte: or the ſeconde is denyed of the third, eyther in whole, or in part: ỹ reaſon that is made of ſuche termes, hath no neceſſarie ſequele, but is called in Greeke ἀσύστατον, that is a reaſon which ſtandeth in ranke, and maketh a ſhewe of an argument, but it is not placed in any ſeat that keepeth a neceſſarie forme of arguing.

Of the ſeconde ranke. Chap. 3.

1 In the ſecond rank the proouing term is the backſette in both the foreſayes: and

as

as the thre termes are placed in order, it is the highest.

2 To this ranke belongeth also foure seates: two generals, and two specials: but they all serue to disproue, and none of them to proue.

3 For it followeth not, because one kind is sayd of two differing kinreds: that therfore the one kinred should be sayd and affirmed of the other.

For though all wheat be corne, and all rie be corne too: yet it followeth not therfore, that any rie is wheat, or any wheate rye.

What maner of termes will serue to make a reason in the fyrste seate of the second ranke.

4 When ye haue thre termes wherof the first is wholly denyed of the seconde, and wholly affirmed of the thirde: they serue to make a reason in Celare, concluding that the seconde terme is wholly denyed of the thirde: as,

1 to haue a talãd
2 tame by nature
3 hauke

} this is ỹ { proouing general / speciall } term.

To haue a talande



5 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Ces Nothing tame by nature hath a ta-
a All haukes haue talandes (land,
therfore,
re No hauke is tame by nature.

6 C. in this word Cesare, sheweth that the reasons placed in this seate, muste be reduced vnto Celaront: and S. telleth how, euen by turning of the firste forelay without rebatement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the seconde seate of the second ranke.

7 When ye haue three termes, wherof ỳ first is wholly affirmed of ỳ secõd, & wholly

ly denied of the thirde, they serue to make a reason in Camestres concluding that the second is wholy denied of the third: as,

1 to haue a talant
2 hauke } is the } speciall } terme
3 tame



8 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Cam { All haukes haue talands
es { no tame foule by nature hath a talant therefore
tres { no tame foule by nature is a hauke

9 C. in this worde Camestres, sheweth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be reduced to Celarent: and M. and the

two S.S. teach howe, to wit, that the foreſayes muſt be chaunged eche into others place: & that the ſeconde fayeſaye and the endſaye, muſt both be turned without rebatement of the ſigne.

VVhat maner of termes vvill ſerue to make a reaſon in the third ſeat of the ſeconde ranke.

10 When ye haue three termes whereof the firſt is wholy denied of the ſecond, and affirmed of the third in part, they ſerue to make a reaſon in Feſtino, concluding that the ſecond is denied of the third in part: as,

1 Forbidden
2 Lawfull
3 Apparell.



11 Set

11 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Fes { No lawfull thing is forbidden,
ti { Some apparell is forbidden,
{ therefore
no { Some apparell is not lawfull.

12 F. In this word Festino sheweth that the reasons placed in this seat must be reduced to Ferio: and S. sheweth howe, euen by turning the first foresaye, wythoute rebatement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fourth seate of the seconde ranke.

13 When ye haue three termes, wherof the first is wholy affirmed of the second: and denied of the third in part, they serue to make a reason in Baroco, concluding that the seconde is denied of the thirde in part: as,

1 Indifferent
2 Lawfull
3 Apparell
} this is ye { prouing general spectall } terme

Indif-



14 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Ba { All lawfull things are indifferent,
ro { Some apparell is not indifferent,
therfore,
co { Some apparell is not lawfull.

15 B. In Baroco noteth that the reasons placed in this seate muste bee reduced to Barbara: and C. sheweth that they must be reduced by waye of impossibilitie, taking a sentence more then a contrarye to the endsay with the first foresaye, and concluding more then a contrary shewsay to the seconde foresay: as,

Bar-

Barbara { All lawfull things are indifferent,
All apparell is lawfull,
therefore
ra { All apparell is indifferent.

16 The endsaye in this reason is manifestly false, therefore one of the foresayes must needes be false too, but the first foresaye it can not be, for that was graũted to be true in the first reason, therfore it must needes be the seconde, whose more then contrary shewsay, was denied to be true afore, so that by this meanes ỹ answerer is forced to graunt that which can not be, to wit, that more then contrary shewsaies should both be false.

Of the thirde Ranke. Chap. 4.

1 In this ranke the proving terme is the foreset in bothe the foresayes, and as the fore termes be placed in order, it is the lowest.
To this ranke belongeth fyre seates, three yeascates and three nayseats, but all concludyng particular sentences.

VVhat

VVhat maner of termes, vvill serue to make a reason in the first seate of the third ranke.

2 When ye haue thre termes whereof the first and the second, are both saide of ỹ third generally, they serue to make a reason in Darapti, concluding that the first must nedes be said of ỹ second in part: as,

1 Euill
2 Creatures } this is the { generall speciall proouing } terme
3 Deuils

Creatures ti. Euill



3 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Da

Darapti { All Deuils are euill,
All Deuils are creatures,
therefore,
Some creatures are euill.

4 D. In this word Darapti, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be reduced to Darij: and P. sheweth howe they must be reduced, euen by turning of the seconde forelaye, without rebatement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes will serue to make a reason in the second seat of the thirde ranke.

5 When ye haue three termes whereof the first is generally denyed of the third, and the second generally affirmed of it too, they serue to make a reason in Felapton, concluding that the first is denyed of the second in part: as,

1 Forgotten vpon (the sudden
2 A gotten quali-
3 Arte. (titie

this is the

general
speciall prouing

terme

A got-



8 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Fe. No arte is forgotten vpõ the sudden,
lap All artes are gotten qualities,
therefore,
ton Some gotten qualitie is not forgotten vpon the sudden.

7 F. In this word Felapton, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat are reduced to Ferio, and P. sheweth how they must be reduced, euen by turning of the seconde foresay without rebatement of the signe.

VVhat manner of termes will serue to make a reason in the third seat of the thirde ranke.

9 When ye haue three termes where

the

the firſt is ſaid in part of the third, and the ſecond wholy affirmed of it tw: they ſerue to make a reaſon in Diſamis, concluding that the firſte is ſaide of the ſeconde in part: as,

1 Necellary
2 Better for the preſent time
3 Correction

this { generall / ſpeciall } terme
of the { wonne }

9 Set downe this reaſon at large thus.

Diſ { Some correction is neceſſary,
am { All correctiõ is bitter for the preſent time,
therefore
is { Some thing bitter for the preſent time is neceſſary.

10 D. In this word Disamis, noteth that the reasons placed in this seate, are reduced to Darij: and the two. S. S. and M. shew how they must be reduced.

11 For the two. S. S. do note, ỳ the first foresay and the endsaye must be turned without rebatement of the signe: & M. noteth that the foresayes must be chaunged ech̃e into others place.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fourth seate of the thirde ranke.

12 When ye haue thre termes whereof the first is generally said of the thirde, and the second is saide therof but in part: they serue to make a reason in Datisi, concluding that the generall is saide of the speciall in part: as,

1 Reprouable
2 Magistrate
3 Offender
} this is ỳ { generall speciall proning } terme

Magi-



13 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Da All offenders are to be reproued,
tis Some offender is a magistrate,
therefore,
i Some magistrate is reprouable.

14 D. In this worde Datisi, noteth that the reasons placed in this seate, are to bee reduced to Darij: and S. sheweth how they must be reduced, euen by turning the seconde foresaye, without rebatement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fifte seat of the thirde ranke.

15 When ye haue three termes, wherof

the firſte is denyed of the thirde in parte, and the ſeconde wholy affirmed of it to: they ſerue to make a reaſon in Bocardo, concluding that the firſte is denied of the ſecond in part.

1 Euill
3 Miniſter
3 True preacher
} this is the { general / ſpeciall / prouing } terme



16 Set downe this reaſon at large thus:

Bo { Some true preacher is not euill,
car { All true preachers are miniſters,
therefore,
do { Some miniſter is not euill.

17 B. In this worde Bocardo, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be reduced to Barbara: and C. sheweth how, to wit, by forcing the aduersarye to graunt an impossibilitie in reason, which in Bocardo is done thus.

18 Ye must take more then a contrarye to the endsay, with the second foresay, and conclude more then a contrary to the first foresaye: for example,

Bar
ba
ra
All Ministers are euill,
All true preachers are ministers,
therefore,
All true preachers are euill.

For the rest, loke the .16. sentence of the thirde chapter.

VVhat maner of termes will serue to make a reason in the sixte seat of the thirde ranke.

19 When ye haue three termes, whereof the first is generally denied of the third, and the second affirmed of it in part: they serue to make a reason in Ferison, conclu-

ding that the generall is denied of the ſpe-
ciall in part: as,

1 Pleaſaunt
2 Profitable } this is the { generall / ſpeciall / proning } terme
3 Correction

20 Set downe this reaſon at large thus.

Fe { No correction is pleaſaunt,
ril { Some correction is profitable,
on { Some profitable thing is not pleaſãt. } therefore,

21 F. In this word Ferison, noteth that the reaſons placed in this ſeat, muſt be reduced to Ferio: and S. ſheweth howe, euen by turning the ſecond foreſaye without rebatement of ſigne.

In

2 In this ranke, no forme of arguing is good, where the second foresay is a naysay: that is to saye, when the speciall terme, is denyed of the prouing terme, either wholy or in part.

If either of the foresayes be left oute of a reason by rule, to knowe which it is.

Chap. 10.

1 If the backset be one in both the shewsayes, the seconde foresaye wanteth, either in the first, or the thirde ranke.

2 But if the foreset be one in bothe the shewsayes, the firste foresaye wanteth, either in the first, or the second ranke.

3 If ye haue two shewsayes, concluding a reason, and one worde a foreset in the first, and a backset in the later, there wanteth the seconde foresaye in the seconde ranke.

4 If ye haue two shewsayes concludyng a reason, and one worde a backset in the firste, and a foreselle in the latter,

there wanteth the firſte, foreſaye in the thirde ranke.

5 Trie theſe rules by the examples ſet forth already in eche ſeat, and ye ſhall ſée they neuer fayle.

To knowe in howe many ſeates eche endſay may be concluded.

1 An vniuerſall yeaſaye is onely proued in Barbara.

2 An vniuerſall nayſaye is thrée wayes concluded, in Celarent, Ceſare, and Cameſtres.

3 A particular yeaſay is foure wayes proued, in Darij, Darapti, Diſamis, and Datiſi.

4 A particular nayſaye is concluded in fyre ſeates, in Ferio, Feſtino, Baroco, Felapton, Bocardo, Feriſon.

5 By this it is plaine, that an vniuerſall yeaſaye is moſte harde to proue, and moſt eaſie to diſproue: & that a particular nayſaye is moſt eaſy to proue, and moſt hard to diſproue.

The fourth Boke of Witcraft.

Of Inuention or fynding out of argumentes. Chap. 1.

1 HOwe the prouing terme muſt lye, to the forefette and backſette of eche demaunde, that a neceſſarie reaſon may be made of thẽ termes, we haue ſhewed afore, in our thirde boke.

2 It followeth nowe, that we teache a way, to get ſtore of prouing termes.

3 For as the good and ready marchaunt prouideth ſtore of ſundry wares, and forteth euery kinde by it ſelfe, adding ſpecial markes for his better direction, that he may with conuenient ſpæde fit and ſerue his cuſtomer whẽ he calleth: So the quick and ſharpe reaſoner, muſt gather general rules together, and place them in order, that he may haue in a redineſſe when nede ſhall be, ſtore of reaſons, for proufe or diſproufe of matters in doubt.

4 Therfore is witcraft wel deuided of the Grecians into two parts: whereof the firste is called in Greke κριτικὴ, that is to say, in englishe, the decerning part: the other is called τοπικὴ, as muche to saye, as the finding parte.

5 This, for that by searching it fyndeth oute the proning terme: The other, not only for that it iudgeth of the forme of an argument: but also for that it descryeth the truth and falshode of al sentences: and noteth the force, and signification of wordes.

6 Some men doe thinke, that the fynding part, is first to be taught, and that by the course of nature it ought to come afore the other in order.

7 For as he that will make an house, first prouideth timber, stone, bricke, clay, lyme, nayles, pinnes, and other thinges, whereof he will haue his house to be buylded: and after hireth workemen, to sette these thinges together, and to frame them in order: which done, his deuised house is finished and made: Euen so the cunning reasoner first findeth out (say they) by the

vse

vse of the places, the matter whervppon he will speake: and after seeketh by the rules of a perfect reason, how to order and dispose the same.

8 This reason in my iudgemente serueth neither for him that woulde practise Witcrafte, nor for him that shoulde teache it.

9 For how can a man eyther inuent or teach any good reasons, to proue matters that lye in doubt, the nature of sentences and wordes, being not first knowne?

10 Seing eche question standeth of them and is not thoroughly knowne, afore the force of eche word be deeply considered, with due consideration had, how the wordes, agree or disagree in a perfect sentence.

11 How to returne this similitude, and to make it good against oure aduersaries, we saye:

12 No craftesman can fitte hymselfe of stuffe, afore hee hath cast in his mynde the shape and forme of the thing, that hee will make.

13 In lyke maner, no good reasoner can fynde out the proning terme, by the vse of the

the places, afore we haue learned by the rules of a perfect reason, what maner of proouing terme will serue his purpose.

14 That is to say, how ỳ proouing terme in the two foresayes, must be coupled or vncoupled to ỳ forset or backset of ỳ question, that ỳ same may be directly concluded.

15 By this it is playne, that the shape of a thing that is to be made, would firste be deuised in mynde, afore the stuffe were prouided:

16 Otherwyse, it will commonly fall forth, that there will bee eyther losse in prouiding to muche, or lacke in prouiding to little.

17 We haue therfore in our three former bookes, spoken of the decerning part of Witcrafte, and haue reserued the fynding parte to be intreated of in this oure fourth Booke.

18 But here I aduise thee of one thing (gentle reader) that thou looke not, that I should set forth all the places, whereof men vse to gather argumentes, and omitte none.

19 For that thing I suppose no man hath

hathe done heretofore: nor shal do hereafter.

20 Neyther is it one mannes worke to begin and ende an art, in suche sort, as nothing can be sayd more.

21 It is well if we wryte that, whiche may profite many: neither is it fit to leaue many good things vndone, or many profitable things vntaught, bycause we cannot do and say, all that is good and profitable.

22 Nowe bicause the tenne storehouses are fit for inuention, I haue thought good to appoynt them for places.

23 And where as there are diuers other places besides, which can not conueniently be referred to any of the ten storehouses, I haue added and interlaced them in suche order, as I iudged was fittest, either for memorie or inuention.

24 The generall places whiche I haue gathered out of sundry authors, to yelde a reasoner store of argumentes, are in number twentie and two: I thinke good to name and order them thus.

24 The

Of
1 Substance.
2 Quantitie.
3 Qualitie.
4 The cause.
5 The effecte.
6 Preparation.
7 Doing.
8 Suffering.
9 Tyme.
10 Place.
11 Order.
12 Having.
13 The forecommers.
14 The aftercommers.
15 The withcommers.
16 The lykelyer.
17 The vnlykelyer.
18 The allyke.
19 A similitude.
20 Witnesses.
21 Gaynsettes.
22 The differing terme.
23 Deuision.
24 Proportion.

25 These places maye bée reduced to a fewe generall poyntes, and diuers wry-

ters

ters vse so to doe.

26 Howbeit in myne opinion that hindereth Inuention, and forceth further matter vppon wordes, then their vsuall signification doth beare.

27 Deuision doubtlesse is a necessarie meane to teache by: and it furthereth lerning very much, to passe by deuision from poynt to poynt: so that you take that occasion which nature or arte offereth, and kæp the propretie of ỳ spæch which ye vse

28 In discoursing vppon the places, I meane to kæpe this order.

29 First I will define the place, and after deuide it: then I will set downe certayne generall rules, in eche particular place, that the groundewoorke and chiefe cause of a reson may be vewed & cõsidered.

30 Fourthly, I wil adde exãples ỳ a beginner may lern by imitatiõ to do ỳ like.

31 Finally I will tel how reasons hold of eche place, and howe they holde not: that the diligent reader maye sæ, what sequele there followeth in reason vppon the groundes and principles of inuention.

32 If any one of these fiue poynts be (at

any

any tyme) omitted, it is eyther for that such things neede not to be spoken of (being very playne of themselues) or for that they are sufficiētly entreated of elsewhere.

33 For that which hath [illegible] taught heretofore, and may seeme necessarie to be interlaced in the discourse of the places, I passe ouer of purpose.

34 Poynting this (gentle reader,) nevertheless, by two numbers, where thou mayst at the first sight, fynd out that which else were necessarie to be here repeted.

Of the first generall place called Substance. Chap. 2.

1 He that wyll discourse orderly, and search a matter to the bottom, must begin with the substāce of the thing he speaketh of.

2 Substance is takē here more largely then it was in the first storehouse.

3 For there it was taken only for a thing that had his being by it selfe: but here substance is taken for any thing that is necessarily required in the essentiall being

being of an other, and it is deuided into seuen partes.

4 The saywhat, the generall terme, the speciall terme, the proper terme, the whole, the parte, and the offspring.

5 Euery one of these haue sundry rules, and argumentes gathered of them holde not all alike, therefore we will entreate of them seuerally.

6 What a saywhat is, and howe many sortes and kindes there are, what things haue the same order and trade of arguing that a saywhat hath, and what fiue special points do appertayne vnto it, looke side 73. Chapter. 4.

Other genetall rules appertayning to a sayvvhat.

7 Whatsoeuer the saywhat doth declare and set forth, the same in that respect is a kinded, and neither a selfe thing, nor a kinde.

8 The saywhat and the kinded (that is to say, the thing declared and set forthe by the saywhat) differ only in words and termes, and not in substance of matter.

9 And therfore nothing (cõcerning sense and meaning) is contayned in the one, but the same also is comprised in the other.

10 And whatsoeuer is denyed or sayd of the one, may in like sort, be denied or sayd of the other.

Examples of argumentes deduced of a sayvvhat.

11 Eche man is mortal, for euery wight indued with reason and sense is mortall.

12 If you will set downe this reason in frame, according to the precise rules afore giuen, doe this.

Bar { Euery wight indued with reason and sense is mortall.
ba { But euery man is a wyght indued with reason and sense, therfore,
ra { Euery man is mortall.

13 Euery wight indued wyth reason and sense, is the sayvvhat of man: so that it beeing mortall, forceth man to be mortall too, by the generall rule of the sayvvhat. Verse. 9.

14 Again thus, death maketh an end of eche man: therfore euery man is mortall, frame this reason in rule thus.

Bar-

Bar ba ra { Ech thing ended by death is mortal
Euery man is ended by death,
Therfore eche man is mortall.

The vse of this place.

15 The first reason is taken of the saywhat of man: the seconde of the saywhat of mortall.

16 For necessarie reasons may be deduced aswel from the sayewhat of the endesayes backset, as from the saywhat of the endsayes forset, and that to proue or disproue indifferently.

Of the generall terme. Chap. 3.

1 In seking out of arguments, we take that for the general terme, which may be truly answered of many specials, whē demaunde is made what they are.

2 As when ye demaund what stoutnes or manhod is, the right answere must be, that manhod is a vertue: in lyke maner if ye aske what temperance is, the fittest answere lyeth, that temperaunce also is a vertue.

3 Therfore vertue compared to manhode and temperance, is a generall.

4 Here note that to these and such like

demaunds the nexte generall is rather to be answered then that which is further of.

5 For when I am asked what a peach is, I shall come nérer to the matter, if I say it is a frute, then if I answere and say it is a creature or a substance.

6 But mine answere should be farmost off from satisfying of mine hearer, if I should say it were a thing.

7 Because he that answereth so generally, makes no distinction in matter, but leaues the demander in as great doubt as he was in at the first.

Rules belonging to the generall terme by the vvhiche thou maist also learne the vse of this place.

8 All things are cõteyned in the generall that are conteyned in any speciall.

9 For if life, reason, sense, learning, will, cúning, &c. be in man, the same things are also of force in a wighte, in a creature, and in a substance, whiche three are all generalls to man.

10 What thing soeuer may be generally affirmed of the generall, the same thing also may be generally affirmed of euery

euery one of his ſpecials.

11 The generall is generally taken, when an vniuerſall ſigne is ioyned to it, and it not diminiſhed of his quantitie by any naywoꝛd, as when ye ſay, eche earthly creature is moꝛtall.

12 Upon this generall, generally granted, you may wel conclude, that euery mā is moꝛtall.

13 But when a generall woꝛd is ioyned to a particular ſigne, oꝛ granted in a ſhew ſay to be true without any ſigne at al, then it maketh no ſufficiēt pꝛoofe of the ſpecial.

14 As when it is alledged, that a wight oꝛ ſome wight is learned, theſe things being granted, do not of foꝛce inferre that all men oꝛ ſome men are learned, moꝛe then any other earthly creature that hath ſēſe.

15 Howbeit, if the general be generally graunted, it maketh good pꝛoofe of all and euery one of his ſpecials: foꝛ who ſo granteth euery earthly wighte to be moꝛtall, granteth alſo by good ſequele in reaſon, that al men, and al beaſts are moꝛtal too.

16 What thing ſoeuer is denied of the generall, without reſtraint of any parti-

cular signe, the same thing may séeme wel, to be denied of any of his specials.

17 For if it be wel sayd, learning is not gotten with ease: it is also well sayd: witcraft is not gotten with ease, spéechcraft, starcraft, Physike, lawe, or any other kind of learning.

18 But if any thing be denied of the generall, by restraint of the particular signe, ỳ same is not therfore denied of any of his specials, but of certaine, suche as the restraint may séeme to limitte.

19 For though I graũt ỳ som houseduck flieth not, yet am not I thereby forced to say, ỳ wilduck flieth not, seing ỳ restraint may séem to be made but to the tame duck.

20 No generall is affirmed of any speciall offspringingly.

21 For it cãnot be truly affirmed, ỳ witnesse is coloured, séeing witnes is a colour and the inholder of witnesse is coloured, be it cloath, woll, yarne, or any thyng elſe that is accustomed to be dyed or coloured.

Of the special terme. Chap. 4.

1 The speciall is here taken for that wherof the generall may be sayde, when

re-

demaund is made of the speciall, and question asked what it is.

Rules belonging to the speciall.

2 Whatsoeuer is sayd of the speciall in part, is sayd also of the general in part.

2 For if some men be learned, some wight is learned.

2 But on the other side in the behalfe of the generall this rule holdeth not.

3 For it foloweth not though some wight be foure foted, that therfore man shuld bee foure foted too.

4 Whatsoeuer is graunted to be in any speciall, must of force be graunted to be in all his generals.

5 If al the specials be graunted, they are sufficient to proue or disproue the general generally, one or many are not.

8 Al specials ar partakers of their general indifferētly, wout respect of more or lesse.

9 For an Egle is no rather nor no more a birde or a foule, then an Oule is, nor an Oule more or lesse then a Wrenne: but they and all other foules equally and indifferently, are named and be in deede birdes, without degree of more or lesse.

Of the proper terme. Chap. 5.

1 What a propertie is, how many kinds of properties there be, what rules may be gathered of the propertie, for proofe of a doubtfull matter: loke in the second boke, where we entreated of a propertie, beginning at the. 75. side, the fifth chapter, and ye shal find ỳ may suffice to serue ỳ turne.

The vse of this place.

2 Of that which is most properly called a propertie, necessarie reasons are made, either to proue ỳ kinred, or to disproue it.

3 But of the other three kinds, the reasons are not of like force, which thing may well be sene by examples thus.

4 Concerning that which is most properly called a propertie, this is a firme and good proofe.

5 Here is present that which is apt to laugh, therefore a man is here present.

6 Or to disproue, here is not presente that which is apte to laugh, therefore no man is here present.

7 Thus it appeareth, that of suche properties as this is, necessarie reasons are gathered either to proue or disproue indifferently.

8 By-

8 Bycause the kinred and this kinde of propertie are necessarily annexed one to another and are neuer seuered asunder.

9 Now properties which appertaine to the first and thirde kinde, they serue well to proue the kindred, but they serue not to disproue it.

10 For it foloweth well, one cunning in Phisicke is present: or one that is gray headed, is present: Ergo a man is present.

11 But these sequels are naught, here is none that is cunning in Phisicke, Ergo here is no man.

12 Or here is none gray headed for age, Ergo here is no man.

13 For there are many men being neither cunning in Phisicke nor graye headed.

14 But there is none either cunning in Phisicke or graye headed, but that he is a man.

15 Bicause therfore these properties appertaine to selfe things of one seueral kinred, it must needes be good in reason, that where the propertie is graunted to be, there must be also the kinred.

16 For that onely in it the propertie hath his being.

17 The second kind of propertie serueth to disproue the kinred: but it will not alwaies of force serue to proue it.

18 For this is a necessary reason, no twosoted thing is present, therefore man is not present.

19 But to proue a man present, it is not sufficient to say, that which hath two feete is present, for manye things els besides man, haue two feete.

Of the vvhole and of his partes. Chapter. 6.

1 The whole and the parte, are like in some things to the generall and the speciall, in so much that it may be said (after a sort) that the generall is a whole to all his specialls: and eche speciall is a parte and portion of his generall, how be it in dede they differ much.

2 For a whole and a part are selfe things: and selfe things are said but of one.

3 A generall and a speciall are common things: & commõ things are said of many.

4 Further

4 Further the generall is affirmed of all his specials: eche speciall bearing both the name and the saywhat of his generall.

5 The whole is not said of his parts, but standeth of them: neither do the partes admit the apt saywhat of the whole, though they (somtimes) haue the same name that the whole hath.

6 For though euery parte of a bone bee called a bone, and euery part of a stone be named a stone, yet the saywhat of the whole is one, and the saywhat of eth parte is another.

7 Let that be taken for a whole, which is a self thing deuided into sundry parts: and that for a part, which is a peece and portion of such a whole.

8 The whole and the parts are respecting termes: for there is no whole, but in respect of parts, nor there can be no parts but in respect of a whole.

9 Therefore in defining of the one, we must of force make mention of the other.

10 Partes are thus deuided: some are necessary parts, some are parts tending to profite, some to pleasure.

11 Necessary

11 Necessarye partes are againe thus deuided.

12 Some are so necessary that the whole can haue no being without them: some are very necessary partes to the well being of an whole, and yet not so necessary but that it may haue a being without them.

13 The head, the necke, and the hart, are very necessarye partes of a man, and so is the matter and the forme of eche whole thing, bee it naturall, or artificiall: without these partes the whole can haue no being at all.

14 Hande, arme, foote, legge, and suche like partes, are very necessary for man, if he shall liue well: yet not so necessarye to any, but that he may both be named a mā, and be a man in deede without them.

15 The forme is more worthy then the matter.

16 For when the forme is atchéeued, the whole is finished, & the matter is brought to his appoynted ende, which els without forme shall lye voyde of vse, and come to no profite.

17 This may be learned at a fonde buil-

der,

der, who bestowing greate cost in prouiding bricke, timber, lime, claye, and other stuffe to builde an house, letteth all come to wast, afore he bring them in frame and adde forme to his matter.

18 Further, some partes are chiefe parts and of great importance, some are meane partes and of small value.

19 One principall parte, will weigh against a multitude of meane partes, and such as are of small weight and value.

Examples of partes, prouing, or disprouing an vvhole.

20 To proue thus: his coate is wel made for the coller is well, the body is well, the sleues are wel, and the pleates are al wel.

21 Againe, to disproue on this sort: this house is not wel builded, for the roufe will not well auoyde water, the walles stande not righte vp, neyther is the foundation sure and fast.

22 But if the case so stande that ye cannot alledge al, or manye chiefe partes, yet alledge

alledge one: for one principall parte will serue for disproufe or disprayfe of the whole.

Examples of a vvhole prouing or disprouing the partes.

23 To proue: this coate is well made, therfore the coller, bodye, sleeues, and the pleates therof are well made to.

24 To disproue: this coate is not good, therefore of force eyther the stuffe or the fashion therof is not good.

The vse of these tvvo places.

25 Argumentes holde of these places diuersly, some beyng necessary, some prouable, some variable, and that as well when the partes are alledged to proue or disproue the whole: as when the whole is alledged for prowfe or disprowfe of his partes.

26 If all partes be recited eyther to proue or disproue: to praise or dispraise the whole, the argumẽt is necessary: if many,

it is

it is probable: if one or a fewe, it is variable.

27 For though one principall parte bee good and of force, to disproue or disprayse the whole: yet one or fewe partes of small value are not.

28 For if the head be naught, the whole body is naught too.

29 But it followeth not, thoughe some one, or some fewe pynnes in an house be rotten or yll driuen, that the whole house shoulde bee sayd to be ill and naught therfore.

30 One or many parts, whether they be principall or of small importance, are not alwayes of force to proue or to prayse a whole.

31 For a song that standeth of foure parts, that is to saye of the base, the meane, the triple, and the contrateno, is not therfore fine and good, because two or three partes be excellently well song.

32 For in such whole things as song and melody are, all the partes are necessarily required to be good, otherwise there shalbe discorde and a iarre in the whole.

33 Neither

33 Neither is it a good reason to say this image is wel painted bycause the haire of the head and of the beard, the nailes of the fingers and of the toes be liuely expressed and set forth.

34 For if many or one principall parte be omitted, a let maye bee in it or them, why the sequele is not good.

Rules belonging to an vvhole or to a parte.

35 Euery whole is bigger then any one of his partes.

36 A whole is equall to all his partes.

37 One parte is not equall in quantitie nor comparable in worthinesse with hys whole.

38 A corruptible parte in time maybe both afore and after his whole.

39 As the timber and nailes of a shippe maye haue a being bothe afore the shippe be made, and after it is taken asunder.

Of

Of the offsprings. Chap. 7.

1 An offspring is properly taken, either for a nowne adiective derived of a nowne substantiue: or for the aduerbe ỳ groweth (as it were) and springeth therof.

2 As of vertue is derived a vertuous man, a vertuous thing, and vertuously: of health, healthfull, and healthfully.

3 But offsprings here are taken as well for the nowne substantiue, which is the originall: as for the nowne adiective and aduerbe which are the derivals.

4 For arguments are gathered indifferently as well of the derivals to proue or disproue the originall; as of the originall to proue or disproue the derivals: bothe kinds properly appertaining to this place.

Howw offsprings are deuided.

5 Some are offsprings in meaning and not in name, as gowne ſe and wel: some in name and not in meaning, as ſkipt and ſkipingly: some in bothe, as vertue and vertuously.

Rules belonging to an Offspring.

6 Offsprings haue like sequele in reasoning.

7 For as one originall is affirmed or denied of another: so is one deriuall, affirmed or denied of another.

8 And contrarywise, as one deriuall is affirmed or denied of another: so is one originall said or not said of another.

9 For example thus: if wealth be a goodnes, the̅ things procuring wealth are good things: & to liue wealthely is to liue well.

10 Againe, if to iudge erroniously, be to iudge falsely, then is errour falshood.

11 Or if erroniously, be not falsely: then is not errour falshood.

12 Erroniously to iudge, & falsly to iudge, differ in this, for that he ỳ iudgeth falsely, hath alwayes a purpose to deceyue: when as he that iudgeth erroniously, swarueth from the truth, & yet not for lacke of good will, which thing when it chaunceth, the partie can not properlye be called a false iudge, nor his errour falshood.

13 This

13 This rule holdeth not in those offsprings which are offsprings only in name: for it followeth not, though sleepe be a goodnes, and though those things that procure sleepe, be good things too, that therfore, that which is sleepingly done, should be saide to be well done: neither is he properly to bee called a sleeper, that sleepeth: but hee that sleepeth to much.

14 So that sleep, a sleeper, and sleepingly, being offsprings in terme and name, and not in sense and meaning, folow not one vppon another in reasoning, as the other two sortes of offsprings do.

Example.

15 I am an huswife, therfore huswifenes should appertaine vnto mee.

Of Quantitie. Chap. 8.

1 After that consideration is had of so muche as pertaineth to the substance of a matter, it followeth next in order, to consider that, which belongeth to the quantitie thereof.

2 Quantitie consisteth in number, weight, and bignesse.

3 Of quantitie we haue intreated in our firſte booke ſide. 20. chap. 3. vnto the which place the diligent reader muſte haue recourſe if he doe not well remember what was ſaide there.

4 It ſhalbe ſufficient for vs to ſet downe here certaine examples thereby to teache the ignorant how reaſons are gathered of this place.

Examples of reaſons vvhich conſiſt in number.

5 If you will builde with ſpéde, hire many labourers: for many handes make rathe worke.

6 And againe, ſtriue not againſt many: for force lieth in a multitude.

7 Item, pardon mée this fault: it is the firſte.

8 Item, forgeue this ſecond treſpaſſe: for twice is not often.

9 The force of theſe and ſuche like reaſons conſiſt in number.

Examples of reaſons vvhich conſiſt in bigneſſe.

10 My ſhoes are euer ill made: for they neuer

neuer fit mée, but are alwayes eyther to long, or to shoꝛt, to wide, or to streight.

11 These arguments are framed onely of bigneſſe.

12 But sometimes bigneſſe and number runne ioyntlye together, sometymes number and weight, as in these.

13 It is past your handreache, being thꝛée yardes bighe.

14 Or it is moꝛe then you can spanne, being twelue intches bꝛoad.

15 Or it is moꝛe then you can fatham, being a yard square.

16 Or it farre palleth your lift, being an hundꝛeth weight.

Of Qualitie. Chap. 9.

1 There is greater varietie of the quality of eche thing, then of the quantitie.

2 What qualitie is, and howe it is deuided ye may learne in the. 4 Chap. of oure first booke.

3 But here, in deuiding of qualitie, I mind to folow that deuision, which experience hath taught to be moſte agreable to com-

mon practise.

4 For they that do throughly sift the qualitie of a thing, vse to consider.

the { Power, Will, Disposition, Sensible qualities, Affections, Passions, Shape } therof.

Of Povver.

5 No deede is atchieued, except power and will concurre, and meete together: if either want, the worke ceaseth.

6 It is to bee considered, whether the power lye in one, or in many: whether it be neere or far of: what it can do by it self, and what, if it be ioyned and coupled with others.

Howe argumentes holde of povver or vvant of povver.

7 Argumentes taken of the want of power, are good and necessarye to disproue: for this reason is of force. Hee had no strength

ſtrength or power to doe this dæde: Ergo he did it not.

8 But argumentes grounded vpon power, that he could do ſuch a facte, and concluding therupon ý he did it, are not good: for many good men can do ill dædes, which they will not doe: and ill men can do good dædes, which they do not.

9 Thoughe power be not ſufficient to proue a fact to bee done: yet is power profitable to perſwade, and to exhorte, that a thing maye be done. And the reaſons gathered therof, are probable.

10 For if you would perſwade a man to take warre, building, or any other enterpriſe in hand: your purpoſe ſhal be greatly furthered, if ye proue that the matter once begon, maye be well accomplished, eyther with eaſe or with honour.

Of VVill.

11 Will is a deſire of the minde, to doe, to ſpeake, or to thinke.

Hovv VVill is deuided.

12 There is a good will, and an ill will.

13 A good will in our english tong, is not alwayes taken for a will to worke that which is good: but for a readines, when the person is prest of himself, not needing any forraine occasion to pricke him forward.

14 An euill will is a will constrayned, and urged by some outward meanes.

15 The first is called a free will: and the second, a forced will.

The vse of this place.

16 If the will of the doer be forced, and not free, he laseth the praise of his well doing in vertue, but not in arte.

17 For no deede can be good or vertuous on the doers behalfe, except it be done vpon a good intent: the intent can not be good, if the will be constrained.

18 But in deedes that are wrought by arte, we praise the cunning of the craftes man, nothing considering with what good will he wrought his worke.

19 If a man be constrained to doe ill against his will, there is a double consideration to be had: one of the force, another of the harme.

21 If

20 If the harme be ſmall, and the force great, the partie is to be holden excuſed: but if the facte bee haynous, no conſtraint can make the doer vnblameable, muche leſſe if the force were ſmal, or ſuche as he myght haue withſtand without any great perill.

21 Thoughe will bee not ſufficiente to proue an acte to be done: yet may wil deſerue prayſe or diſpraiſe, euen in them that want power to do good or yll.

22 For this reaſon is not good, he wold haue done wrong, therfore he did wrong in deede.

23 But theſe are good, he would fayne do well, therfore he deſerueth thankes: or he would fayne do harme, therfore he deſerueth blame.

Of diſpoſitions.

24 Conſider whether they be good or ill: and whether they be ſettled and rooted in the partie, that he cannot ſoon leaue them: or that they be ſubiecte to ſodeyn chaunge, and without continuaunce.

25 They of the firſte ſorte ſerue to enlarge, or to increaſe a matter, eyther in praiſe of the good, or diſprayſe of the badde: they of the ſecond ſort, are rather fit to extenuate, then to amplifie.

26 Here we haue to cõſider the maners of the partie, his entertaynment, the vſage of himſelfe, his vertues, his vices, his cunning, his knowledge, his ignorance, his craft, his ſleyght, his trickes, his knacks, his prankes, his touches. &c.

Examples of diſpoſition, or manners.

27 Place not this fellowe in any office: for he is negligent, and a riotous perſon.

28 Buie not this gelding: for he is reſtie.

29 Commit not your lyfe into this Phyſitians hãdes: for hee is ignorannt in his booke, and lacketh experience.

30 Laye no wager vpon the running of this greyhound: for he vſeth to lye off.

Of ſenſible qualities.

31 The vſe of this place is very common, and

and yeldeth many argumentes, some gathered of the colour, which the eye seeth: some of the voyce, whiche the eare heareth: some of the sauor, which the nose smelleth: and some of the tast, which the toung discerneth: some of hotnesse, coldnesse, moystnesse, dryenesse, hardnesse, softnesse. &c. whiche sealing iudgeth.

Examples.

32 Take thys cloth, the colour is good.

33 Chose this boy quicklier, for his voice is sweete and pleasant.

34 Get some greene herbs and Mayflowres, for a good smell is comfortable.

35 Dippe youre meate in vineger, and it shall taste the better.

36 This grounde is waterish, therfore it is not good to be sowen.

Of affections.

37 There are diuers opinions cõcerning affections: some men hold, that all affections are euill, and that no good man will vse or nourishe any of them: some hold, that many of them are good, and that they are giuen of God vnto man, for sundry good purposes.

38 Doubt-

38 Doubtleſſe mercie, pitie, loue, anger, ſpite, diſdayn, hope, affiance, hate, diſtruſt, contempt, enuie, malice, mirth, gladneſſe, græfe, and feare, &c. are oft alledged as good matter to proue or diſproue, to exhorte, or diſſuade.

Examples of affections.

39 I will not be his ſeruant, he is too teſtie: he will not long dwell in one opinion, for hee is fickle headed: this bitche will not hunt, for ſhe is proude.

Of paſsions.

40 Some take paſſions for any affection, be it greate or ſmall: but in oure Engliſh ſpeche we vſe this terme, when wee would expreſſe a vehement pang, eyther of the bodie, or of the mynde.

The vſe of this place.

41 If a fault be committed, through any paſſion or pang, eyther of the mynde or bodie, the pang ſhall excuſe the fact, if the patient himſelf were no cauſe herof at al.

42 If he were ſome occaſion, yet not the chiefe occaſion therof, then it ſhall extenuate

penuate the facte:

43 But if he was the onely cause, or the chiefe cause of his owne maladie: then the passion procureth to the partie, neyther pardon nor pitie: for it is commonly and truely sayde: He that will kill when he is drunke, shall be hanged when he is sobre.

Examples of Passions.

44 This mans deede of gifte, is not good in the lawe: for he was straughte, and beside himselfe, when he sealed it.

45 Take heede of that Dogge, for he is madde.

Of Forme.

46 Forme, fashion, shape and making: are counted of some, as parte of a thyng, and so they be in very deede, if the matter be narrowly considered; howbeit, a parte (by the iudgement of the common sorte) is taken onely for a bodyed portion of a sole substaunce: and manye reasons are gathered of the forme of a thyng, by them which neyther thinke forme or fashion any parte at all.

47 Wee will therefore make forme a place

place by it selfe, following that in arte, which we learne to be common in practise.

48 Fairenes and fauour appertaine to this place, they differ in this, that fairenesse consisteth chiefly in colour, and fauoure in proportion.

The deuision of forme and fashion.

49 There is a newe fashion and an olde fashion: a straunge fashion, and an vsual fashion: a trimme fashion, and a rude fashion: a commodious fashion, and an vnprofitable fashion. &c.

Examples of Forme.

50 My yong Lord will loue my lady his wyfe righte well: for she is bothe faire and well fauoured.

51 This hoyse and this greyhounde can not chose but be good: there is such trimme making in them both.

Of the causes. Chap. 10.

1 No man is saide to knowe anye thyng throughly, afore he know the causes therof.

2 A cause is a meane, wherby anye thyng is made to haue a being.

The

The deuision of causes.

3 There are foure causes: the matter, the forme, the workman, and the ende.

The
1 Matter.
2 Forme.
3 Workman.
4 Ende.

4 Matter is the stuffe, whereof a thing is made.

5 Forme is the shape and fashion, which added to the matter, maketh the thing perfect, and yeldeth both name and being thereunto.

6 Workmen are doers, from whence mouing first commeth.

7 An ende is the vse of a thyng that is made, causing the workman to take the enterprise in hande.

8 Of this it is playne, that matter without forme is vnprofitable stuffe: and that forme is not added to the matter without a workeman: nor that any thing worketh, except it be moued by some profitable ende.

Therfor do authors knit these four causes to-

togyther, which knowledge are very profitable: and reasons are gathered of them very orderly.

Examples of the causes.

10 As if I say: My bootes are good, for they kepe out wete wel: Myne argument is taken of the matter: for the cause is the goodnesse of the leather, whereof my bootes are made:

11 But if I saye, I lyke my bootes wel, for they are fit for me, and well shapen: my reason is taken of the forme, whiche consisteth in the fashion of the boote.

12 If I say, My bootes are well made for he that made them is a cunning shoemaker: my reason taketh his force of the workeman.

13 If I say, I make my bootes thus, for I mynde to ryde dyre: my reason taketh his force of the ende, whiche is the vse, or purpose to haue of my bootes.

14 Thoughe forme and matter may well for breuenesse sake, be reckened as partes, and so be referred to the first generall place whiche we called substaunce, bicause the cause seemeth to be without the thing

thing, where as these haue their beeing in the thing: nay rather the thing it selfe is nothing else but the forme and matter ioyned together, and taken as one: yet in common speach, we neuer seeme otherwise to consider of a part, then as it is a bodied portion of some whole.

15 Therefore haue I made Matter and Forme, places by themselues.

16 If any man be contentious, and say, that it is but chat, to teache one thing often: I aunswer, that it is no inconuenience, that one argument (vpon sundry respects) be referred to sundrie places.

Rules appertaining to the Matter and the Forme.

17 The matter may be good of a thyng, though the forme be ill: as the golde in the ring may be good, and the fashion of the ring nought.

18 Agayne, the forme may be good, and the matter nought: as the shoe maye bee well made, and yet the leather keepe outs no water.

19 So that nothing can be ill, whose form and matter are both good; nor nothing can be good, if eyther his matter or his forme be ill.

Howe workmen are deuided.

20 There are three kyndes of workers: some things doe worke as nature teacheth them: some as reason guydeth them: and some at aduenture.

21 The first worketh of necessitie, the seconde of freewill, the third by chaunce.

22 Workemen are also many sundrye wayes deuided: for some do worke thinges in common, and some do things alone: some worke much in short tyme, and do it ill, and some work little in long tyme, and do it wel: some worke for pleasure, and some for profite: some of force, and some of freewill. &c.

Generall rules belonging to workmen.

23 When there are naturall and necessarie workemen, there muste needes be necessarie and naturall workes.

24 And

24 And againe, where the worke is necessarie, and naturall, there the workeman must bee so too.

25 One workeman alone can not doe a common worke.

26 He worketh fast inough, that worketh that well, which he doth.

27 And he worketh ouerfast, that doth any thing ill, or amisse.

28 He worketh well, that worketh with aduisement.

29 And he ofte faulteth in his work, that hasteth to muche.

30 He is a singular workeman that will ridde much in shorte tyme, and doe it well withall.

Generall rules and principles gathered of an ende.

31 If the ende of a thing be good and lawfull, then is the preparation, and all things tending to that ende, lawfull too.

32 For if it be lawful to fight in defence of of a mannes countrey, then is warre, and

the vse of a mans weapon lawfull:

54 But if the ende be vnlawfull, and ill, then are all thinges ill, and vnlawfull, that are appointed to that ende.

Of the Effect of things. Chap. 11.

1 After wee haue searched out the causes of thinges, it behoueth vs to consider their effect: which is nothing else, but the workmans deede.

Howe vvorkes and effectes are deuided.

2 Some workes are done only with the bodie: some only with the mynde: some by helpe of them both: some are workes that tende to profite: some to pleasure: some are vaine, tending to no good vse at all: there is a long worke, and a short worke: a slowe worke, and a quicke worke: an ill worke, and a good worke, &c.

Rules gathered of an effect, or of the vvorke that is done.

3 If the worke be well done, the cost that

is made thereuppon, is well bestowed, and the workeman deserueth his praise.

4 If the worke be not more worth, then the cost that is bestowed vppon it, there is labour lost.

5 That worke is good, whiche commendeth the workeman, and that a naughty worke which putteth the doer to shame.

6 The worke of the mind in good things is alwayes more excellente, then the worke of the body: but in il things, it is farre worse.

An example of an Effecte.

7 Fuchsius was a good Phisitian: for hee hath done many notable cures.

8 If ye will set downe this reason at large, do thus:

Da — Whosoeuer hath done many notable cures was a good Phisitian,
ri — But Fuchsius hathe done many notable cures, therefore
i — Fuchsius was a notable Phisitian.

Of preparation. Chap. 12.

1 As the efficient cause doth alwayes respect an effect: so doth the end or finall cause require a preparation.

2 By preparation I understande not only the acte of prouiding: but the things also ỹ are prepared, as meanes to bring a purpose or deuise to passe.

Howe preparation is deuided.

3 Preparation is eyther greate or small, sumptuous or meane: open, or secrete: lawfull or vnlawfull: to muche, to littel, or in a meane.

Rules belonging to preparation.

4 If preparation be made, there muste needes be an ende purposed: but contrarywise it followeth not, that yf there bee an ende purposed, there shoulde bee by and by preparation made, bycause the ende is in purpose, afore the meanes can be gotten, that are prepared for an ende.

5 Agayne, if preparation be not made,

no

nor things prouided that are necessarily required for an ende: it followeth that the end is not obteyned.

An example of preparation.

6 There will be warre, for there is a generall muster taken through the whole realme: a number of souldiers are prest into wages, the Queenes Ships furnished with men, vitayle, and shot: and greate prouiding of armoure.

Of doing. Chap. 13.

1 No doer, or efficiente cause, can make any worke: nor no preparation will serue to obteyne any ende without doing. Therefore in mine opinion, the storehouse of doing followeth right aptly in this place. For doing is the labour that is taken in making of a worke, which bringeth the workeman by meanes (as by steps and degrees) to hys appointed end.

How doings and labour are deuided.

2 Some doinges leaue a worke which

remayneth to be ſéene after the labor is en-
ded, as the doing that is beſtowed in buil-
ding an houſe, leaueth an houſe to be vew-
ed and ſéene when the worke is finiſhed.

3 Some doings leaue behinde them no
ſuche worke, as may be ſéene with eie, and
yet a worke tw, as the trauaile and payne
that is taken in getting of learning.

4 Learning is the worke that remay-
neth of the labour, which though it cannot
be vewed by the eie, yet maye it not there-
fore be called no worke, or ſayde not to re-
maine.

5 For learning remayneth in déede in the
minde of man, and differeth much from the
paine that was taken in getting of it.

6 Agayne, there is a ſharpe labour, a
ſofte labour, and a meane labour: the
firſte ſerueth for ſpéede, the ſeconde for eaſe,
the thirde for continuance.

Rules of Labour.

7 That labour is well beſtowed that
bringeth forth a good worke.

8 The

8 That is lost labour, and in vaine, that faileth of his appointed ende.

9 Haste in doing maketh waste in the worke: as the common saying is: haste maketh waste.

An example of Doing.

10 These are ill men: for they sweare, they dice, they ravishe, they robbe, they kyll.

Of Suffering, and of his diuision.
Chapter. 14.

1 We must consider, whether the suffering be in the body, in the minde, or in external things: as what losse the party hath sustained, what domage, what pain, what sickenesse, what griefe. &c.

An example of Suffering.

2 He loueth mée entirelye: for hée hath ventured his life, and sustained great displeasure for my sake.

Of time and place. Chap. 15.

1 What place and time are, loke in our first booke the. 24. side, and. 27. 28. verses.

2 And for the deuision of time loke. 41. side, beginning at the. 6. verse, and so forth till ye come to the twelfth.

3 And to knowe howe places are deuided, loke the. 43. side, and the. 22. verse.

An example of place.

4 I had no libertie this moneth to bee where I woulde: for I was all this time in prison.

An example of time.

5 Aristotle was not king Alexanders scholemaister: for Aristotle was deade afore king Alexander was borne.

Of the vse of these two places.

6 Necessarye argumentes maye be gathered

thered of time and place to disproue: but to proue or perswade, they are but probable.

7 For this reason holdeth of force: the partie that is accused, to haue done thys murther, was not in that place, where the fact was don, or had no being at that time: Ergo he is not giltie of that crime.

8 Nowe if you reason, he was there at that time, and none sene there but hee: it argueth a probabilitie, that he should haue bene the doer, but it forceth no necessitie.

Of Order. Chap. 16.

1 Order is a thing very necessarye in all matters. For no armie is of force, excepte the men be in araye and in order: no house can stand except the timber and stone bee laide in due order: no fire will burne, except the stickes and the coales lie in order: no writing can be red except ỳ letters be set in order: no talke can bee vnderstanded, except the wordes be spoken in order: to conclude, nothing is weldon, that is not done

done in order: and nothing is ill done, but that is done out of order.

The vse of this place.

2 This place yeldeth manye probable argumentes, to perswade or dissuade, to praise or dispraise.

3 But necessary reasons to proue a facte to be done or not done, it yeldeth fewe.

4 Thoughe placing, of it selfe (narowly sifted) admit no degrees of more or lesse: yet when the ordering of one thyng is compared to the ordering of another, cõmon speache vseth to make degrees, and to saye one thing is better ordered, then another.

5 For we vse to say: the armie is in better order nowe, then it was afore: or the common weale is better gouerned now, then it hath bene heretofore.

An example of Order.

6 The state of the common weale must nedes

nedes some change, all things are so farre out of order.

Of Hauing. Chap. 17.

1 Argumentes are taken of Hauing, when the force of the reason dependeth of the Hauing of a thing, and not of the thing that is had or possessed.

2 As when it is said: come not neare this beare, for she hath whelpes.

3 The force of this reason lieth not in the whelpe: but in hauing of a whelpe.

4 This place is very common, and argumentes rise thereof very rifely.

5 As if I saye: he hath a weapon, take heede of him.

6 Item, he hath good frendes, much money, and an hautie stomacke, therfore medle not with him.

7 Item, he hath corne of his owne, what nedes he to borow, or bie in the market.

Of Commers. Chap. 18.

1 Commers are a generall place, containing

taining forecommers, aftercommers, and withcommers.

2 For some things comming afore hand, are signes and warnings of that which is to come: some things following after, are remembrances and monumentes of that which hath bene: and diuers things vsing to chance at once, are witnesses and assurances one of another.

Of the vse of these places.

3 Forecommers serue to proue that a thing shal be, or shall not be: and they appertaine to the time to come.

4 Aftercommers, serue to proue, that a thing hath bene, or hath not bene: and they appertaine to the time past.

5 Withcommers serue to proue that a thing is or is not: and they pertaine to the time present.

6 If the commers chance alwayes after one sorte: then are the reasons deduced therof necessarye.

7 If they chance often, or for the more parte: then are the argumentes taken of them

them likely and probable.

8 If they chance but seldome, and misse as oft as they hitte: then the reasons gathered of them are coniecturall, and prognosticallike, as oft false as true.

Examples.

9 Of forecommers we reason thus: whē these things come to passe, then doe these and these things folowe: but these forethings are come, therefore the aftercommers will folowe.

10 For example thus: if it be a ruddie euening, & a gray morning, thē the day folowing shalbe faire: but yesternight was ruddie, and this morning is graye, this daye therfore will be faire.

11 Of aftercōmers we reason thus: these things cannot be, but such and such things went before: seing then the aftercommers are past, the forecommers are past also, as for example: this woman geueth milke, Ergo she hath had a childe: for geuing of milke commeth after hauing a childe.

12 Of withcommers thus: the sword was solemnly caried abrode in the court: Ergo, the

the Quéenes maiestie was there.

13 Item, if you will haue warre, looke for cost, trouble, and daunger, for these are incident, and cleane to euery person, that will liue in warres.

14 He hath a cough, a stitch, and an ague: Ergo, he hath the pleuresie.

Of comparison. Chap. 19.

1 When two or moe are compared together in any one thing: eyther they are equall, and of like force concerning the matter in which they are compared: or vnequall, and of vnlike force therin.

2 If they be equall, and of like value: then they serue indifferently turne for turne, one to proue, or disproue another.

3 But if one exceede another in anye degree of worthinesse: then the reasons that are taken of the likelier, holde well to disproue: and the reasons taken of the vnlikelier, hold well to proue: but contrarywise, the reasons are not good.

4 For the likelier will not proue the vnlikelier: nor the vnlikelier will not disproue

proue the likelier.

5 For it is no good reason to say, the Lord of the soyle may sell the wood of this Lordship, Ergo the tenauntes may sell it: or the tenauntes may not sell principall timber, Ergo, the Lord may not.

6 Howe the Lorde is the likelyer to make suche a sale: and the tenauntes the vnlikelier.

Rules belonging to the equall.

7 Among equal things this is a generall rule, loke what is good or lawfull in one, the same shalbe good or lawful in another: and what is ill or vnlawfull in one, the same shalbe ill or vnlawfull in another.

8 Item, loke what one can or cannot: the rest in like maner can, or cannot: otherwise they are not equall.

9 With thine equall thou shalte haue equall lawe and portion: like labour, like wage: like paine, like reward: like fault, like punishement: and generally like requireth like.

Rules of the likelier.

10 That the likelier cannot, the vnlikelier much lesse can.

11 What will please the worthier, maye content the meaner.

12 Loke what wyll not fit the lykelyer, the same will not fit the more vnlike.

Rules of the vnlikelier.

13 That which the vnlikelier can compasse, may be compassed of the likelier.

14 Loke what will serue the vnlikelier, the same will serue the likelier.

15 That which will not please the meaner, will ill please the better.

16 They that take the likelier to be that which is more: and the vnlikelier to be that which is lesse: and the alyke to be that which is equall in quantitie, and so terme these places, places of ye more, of the lesse, and of the equall, are foulye deceyued.

17 For likelier, vnlikelier, and alike, consiste in other things, as well as in quantitie: wheras more, lesse, and equall, (if

(if they be properly considered) consist onlye in quantitie.

18 Further, often times the argument that is taken of the likelier is grounded vppon the lesser quantitie, and that argument that is taken of the vnlikelier, vpon the greater quantitie, which thing should neuer be, if their supposition were true.

19 For if I say, two are likelier to speede then three, therefore sends not three, but two:

20 The reason is grounded vppon two, the likelier to disproue three the vnlikelier, yet are two in verye deede the lesser number, and three the bigger.

21 Therfore likelier and vnlikelier, are not alwayes more and lesse in respecte of quantitie, but likelier is that which is of more possibilitie in reason: and vnlikelier that which is of lesse possibilitie, and that in any respect whatsoeuer.

Of a similitude. Chap. 20.

1 A similitude is properlye no place but a kind of reasoning, when the liklines

of one thyng argueth (as it were by example) the lyke sequele in reason of another thing: for example sake, thus.

2 As the free pasyng horse maye not long together galloppe vpon the spurre: so the sharpe and pregnant wytte, maye not muche wythout intermission, be forced to muse vppon difficulte and harde matters.

3 Learned men in arguing, make small accompt of any similitude.

4 For by a similitude you maye as soone proue a wrong matter, as a righte: yet doe men of great iudgement vse it, but rather to perswade and leade the simple and the ignoraunt, then to force and ouercome the wittie aduersarie.

5 For a good and a shamefast nature, yeldeth in that, whych he seeth so liuelie expressed in another thing, that by no shift of reason, he can make any resistance.

6 It is good for makyng or answering of a similitude, to learne wherein thyngs agree or disagree.

7 A similitude is well answered, when an vnlikelinesse is shewed in that matter, wherin

wherein diuers things were sayde to bee like.

Of VVitnesses. Chap. 21.

1 A Witnesse is the worde, writte, or deede of a credible person, proouing a matter that lieth in doubt.

How VVitnesse is deuided.

2 The witnesses vpon whose authoritie proofes are grounded, are either heauenly, earthly, or infernall.

3 Gods worde, his wonders, his miracles, and his message, sent to men by angels, and Prophetes, are alledged as heauenly witnesses:

4 Law, custome, othe, bargain, writings, sayings, and so forth, are accompted as humaine witnesses, and such as are taken of the credite of man:

5 Coniuring, witchcraft, appearing of ghostes, oracles and answeres of diuels,

are infernall and vngodlye witnesses, vsed onelye of the wicked, and suffered of God for a punishement to deceyue them, that will not beleeue the true meanes that god hath appoynted.

6 Witnesses are not so muche founde out by the arte and cunning of the spokesman: as they doe arise of the matter it selfe, and are ministred to him by the information of others.

7 Therfore, arte teacheth not so muche to finde oute witnesses: as to vrge them forceablely for proufe of the matter that lyeth in question.

Of Gaynsets. Chap. 22.

I thinke it needlesse, here to repeate, how many kindes of gaynsettes there be: what eche kind is, wherin they differ one from another: or what els hathe bene spoken of them in oure former Workes: bycause it may suffice the diligent reader, to be referred by oure marginall note, to those places where theso things are intreated of at large.

Of

Of respecting termes and yokefelovves.

2 Respecting termes may well bee named yokefelowes, for that they are knit, and coupled together with a certain band of societie.

3 For the maister, and the seruaunt: the parentes, and the children: the goodman and the goodwife: the landlorde, and the tenaunt: the guest, and the hoste: and all other respecting terms, are alwaies coupled and ioyned together in some kinde of felowship.

Howve reasons doe holde of yokefelovves and respecting termes.

4 When reasons are gathered of yokefelowes to proue the being, or not being the one of the other, they are necessary: but when they are taken of the duetie and affection, that is or should be betwene them, then are they but probable.

Examples.

5 He is a father, therefore he hathe a sonne: he is not my guest, therefore I am not his hoste: these and suche like are necessary reasons.

6 But if I saye, the iudge will take my parte, for he is my frende: or if I saye, he will iudge against me, because he is my foe: or els my matter shall haue good successe in the lawe, for I pertaine to the Courte: these and suche like reasons, take their force vpon respecte, and are but probable reasons, not necessary argumentes, and such as holde of force.

Of depriuing termes.

7 Naturall power and want of naturall power, compared together, and one proued or disproued by another, are taken for depriuing termes.

8 Wee vse to reason vppon them in this sorte: he seeth, therefore he is not

blynde: or agayne, hee is blynde, therfore he saith not.

9 This kinde of reasoning alwayes foloweth of force, that where the power is, ther can not be the want: and where wante is, there can not be the power.

10 Wee may also reason vpon the depriuing termes, on this sort and maner.

11 If lack of sight be a lack of some sense, then must sight it selfe needes be a sense: or if sight it selfe be a sense, then must lacke of sight, be a lacke of sense too.

12 Here is to be noted, that this place serueth as well to proue the wante by the power: as contrarywise to proue the power by the want.

13 Now for contraries this is to be noted: that arguments gathered of them, take their force, sometyme of contrary termes, sometymes of contrarie sayings.

14 Contrarie sayings are here taken not only for two generall shewsayes, which differ in qualitie, and make no chaunge at all, eyther of forefet or backfet (as was sayde in 3. verse of the. 88. side) but also those are contrarie sayings, whiche stande of contrarie

termes, and doe appertayn to contrarie maners, be the sayings particular or general.

Howe to decerne contrarie sayings, which are contrarie by reason of termes, and not by reason of qualitie.

15 When the foresette and backset of a shewesay, haue eyther of them a contrarye termne, then those foure contrarye termes, may two seuerall wayes bee coupled togyther, to make contrarie sayings:

16 Eyther when the forset is one in both the shewsayes, and the backsets be contraries: or else when the backsette is one, and the foresets contraries.

17 But and if bothe the foreset and backset in two shewsayes be contrary eche to other: then those sentences stande of contrarie termes, but they are not contrarie sayings: bicause suche are of lyke ioyce in reason, neyther is there any resistance in the sayings, but a contrarietie in the termes.

18 They that think this rule obscure and strange, may by this example that folowth and suche lyke, make it to themselues familiar and playn: as thus,

19 Ver-

19 Vertue is worthie prayse; the forefet of this shewsaye, hath vice to his contrarie, and the backsette, hath blame. Nowe these foure contrarie termes, Vertue, vice, prayse, and blame, are two seuerall wayes coupled together in shewsayes, to make contrarie sayings.

20 Either when the forefet remaynes one in both the shewsayes, the backsets being contraries: as,

Vertue is { worthy prayse, / worthy blame. or,
Vice is { worthy prayse, / worthy blame.

Or else when the backset is one, and the forefets are contraries: as,

{ Vertue / Vice } is worthie prayse. or,
{ Vertue / Vice } is worthie blame.

21 But and if the foresayd foure termes be coupled any third way together, to make two shewsayes: the shewsayes themselues shall not be contrary, though the termes where they stand be contrarie, as they are copared one with another: For example thus:

Vertue

Vertue, Vice } is worthie { praise. blame. or,
Vertue, Vice } is worthie { blame. praise.

22 For the two firste are bothe true and good: and the other two are both false and ill. Nowe for the two firste, it is reason good inough, to say, they are both true and good, ergo, they ar not contrary sayings. For one true saying is neuer contrary to an other true saying: nor one good thing, is neuer contrary to an other good thing.

23 But for the two seconde sayings, it is no sufficient argument, to say, they are both false, or both ill, ergo, they are not contrary sayings: bicause an ill thing, may be contrary to a good thing, and to an ill thing too: and a false saying may be contrary, as well to a false saying as to a true. Therfore it behoueth to adde this withall, that they are both of like choice, and may bothe at once fall to be in one man.

24 For a man may both praise vertue & blame vice, and yet vse therein no contrarietie of speach at al, which thing could not be, if they were contraries in deede.

Of

25 Of this place wee maye gather bothe probable and necessary arguments, to proue or to disproue.

26 For if I argue thus: Socrates is sicke: Ergo he is not in health: or say, this lyne is not streight, Ergo it is crooked: the reasons are necessarie, and doe inforce the one a being, the other a not being.

27 But and if I reason on this wyse, and say, The lawe alloweth mee to prayse well doers, though I can not proue they did wel, Ergo the lawe suffereth mee lykewyse, to dispraise ill doers, thoughe I wante witnesse to proue they did yll: My reason may seeme probable: for that it standeth wyth reason, that contrary maners should haue contrarie fame and report.

28 Yet is it not necessarie, seeing it doth not generally holde: neyther is it lawfull in a good common wealthe: for one man alone without sufficient proufe to dispraise, though to prayse it be lawful, bycause there ryseth no suche stryfe about prayse, as doth commonly aboute dispraise: therefore for quiet-

quietnesse sake, the Law forbiddeth the one: and for an incouragement to well doing, it alloweth the other.

Of those that are termed more then contraries.

29 Arguments gathered of those which are termed more then contraries, are always necessarie, either to prove, or to disprove, taking their force, sometymes of the worde, sometymes of the saying.

30 Of the worde, because the yeaworde and nayeworde, are of suche propretie and force, that if one of them be sayde of any thing, the other can not be sayd of the same.

31 And againe, if the one be not, the other is: he therefore that proveth the one, doth consequentely disprove the other: and he that doth remove the one, enforceth the other.

32 Of the saying, because that more then contrary sayings, are euer one true, and an other false,

33 Therefore, if this saying (All fayre women are good) be false; then this saying,

(Some

some faire women are not good) muste needes be true: and againe, if this saying (some faire women are good) be true, then is this saying (no faire women are good) false.

24 This place shall yelde necessarie argumentes also of the worde, which wee change the termes, and argue thus: If man be a creature, then that which is no creature is no man: and againe, if no creature bee no manne, then is euery manne a creature.

25 This kind of arguing is alwayes necessary, excepte the backset be a chanceable inbeer to the foreset, and then the argumēte is not necessarie, bycause the chanceable inbeer may be saide, and not saide of his inholder: and therefore this reason holdeth not, man is iuste, Ergo he that is not iuste, is no man.

26 Those argumentes that driue men to an impossibilitie in reason, are commonlye gathered of this place: and the rule whereupon they bee grounded, is moste certayne; in so muche that some Authoures laboure to proue all prin-

ciples

principles by it, and makes it an only staye, why wranglers cánot proceed in reasoning to an endelesse worke.

Of the differing terme. Chap. 23.

1 Thinges differ one from an other by three seuerall degrees: the first, is by kynde: the seconde, by kinred: the third, by speciall beeing.

2 Specials whiche are not comprysed vnder one next generall, differ in kynde: as a man and an oke: for the nexte generall to man, is a wight: and the next general to an oke, is a tree: therefore a man and an Oke differ in kynde, because they are conteyned vnder diuers kyndes, whereof one is not comprised of an other.

3 Selfe things conteyned vnder dyuers kinreds, and also the kinreds them selues conteyned vnder one next kynde, differ in kinred: As this horse and this asse: or an horse and an asse: for notwithstanding that these agrée in their kynde (by reason that eche kynde is indifferently sayde of things that are vnder it) yet notwithstanding they

plainly

playnely differ in kinred, an horſſe and an aſſe beeing diuers kinreds themſelues: and this horſſe and this aſſe beeing ſelfe thinges conteyned vnder diuers kinreds.

4 Diuers ſelfe thinges conteyned vnder one loweſt kinred, though they agree bothe in kinde and in kinred: yet do they differ in ſpeciall beeing: as Iohn and William, this man and that man. For Iohn is as well a man and a wight as William is: and William as well as Iohn: ſo that they neyther diſſent in kinred nor in kynd: neuertheleſſe they diſſent much in ſpeciall beeing: for one of them hathe not the ſame ſpeciall beeing that the other hath.

5 Loke howe many wayes there are for things to diſſent: and ſo many wayes are there alſo for them to aſſent: for gayneſſettes haue one order and trade of learning.

6 Things that diſſent in kind, diſſent alſo in kinred, and in ſpeciall beeing: and things that agree in ſpecial beeing, agree alſo in kinred, and in kinde: But it followeth not that thoſe things which diſſent in ſpeciall beeing: ſhould alſo diſſent in kinred, or in kynd: nor that thoſe thinges which agree in kynde or

in kinred, shoulde therefore agree in special beeing. So that they dissent most that differ in kynde: and they agree neerest that agree in speciall beeing.

7 When thinges vpon diuers respectes are ryghtely sayde, eyther to agree, or disagree: then vse this distinction of agreeing, or dissenting, as may best serue your present purpose.

Of the vse of this place.

8 This place yeldeth necessarye argumentes to disproue, as when ye argue and saye: Yonder is a Skarrowe, and therefore no man: or an Horse, and then no Asse: Or it is Wyllyam, and not John.

9 These reasons and suche lyke, are of force, because of thinges whiche dissent in generall or special beeing, it cannot be, that one of them shoulde be that thing, which another of them is.

10 But to proue this place, yeldeth no necessarie arguments, except it be vpon some graunted supposition: as when it is supposed and iudged of the gaynesayers, that th

the thing whereabout they striue, is eyther an Horse or an Asse: then if one of the gaynsayers proue the thing in controuersie, to be no horse: it followeth by force of the supposition graunted, that it is an Asse.

Of Deuision, the 24. Chap.

1 That Deuision is a place by it selfe seuered from other particular places, and that specyall Argumentes are gathered thereof, it is manyfeste, in as muche as certayne generall Rules for proufe or disproufe of doubtfull matters belong vnto it, whyche can not fitly be referred to any other particular place.

2 Wee will therefore intreate of Deuision heere among the places: And for that there is greate and necessarye vse thereof, we will speake of it at large.

3 For besydes that it serueth for Inuention, and fyndyng oute of Reasons to proue matters, the whyche lye in doubte: it hemmethe in the speaker

with certayne listes and boundes, that he can not lightly digresse from his purpose: it occasioneth the hearer to marke howe euerie parte of the Deuision is prosecuted and handeled in order: it amplifyeth and serueth well to dilate and laye forth a matter at large: It sharpeneth our memorie, and makes vs better able to call things to remembrance, by reason that in a Deuision things are layd forth by number and order: it lyghteneth oure vnderstandyng, making an easie and speedy entrance into the cause: Fynally, an Oration without a deuision, maye well bee compared to a straggling Armye: For as those men of warre, bee they neuer so experte or couragious of themselues, are of no force to giue battell, whyles they wander out of battell araye: euen so, wordes and sentences be they neuer so apt, picked, or trimme, are of no strengthe to persuade, when they are vttered without a deuision, cast (as it were) on heapes, without order, and tending to no speciall issue.

Howe deuision is deuided.

4 There is a deuision of matter: and a diui-

deuision of wordes.

5 Matter is deuided, when a discourse is reduced and brought vnto certayne speciall poyntes.

6 The deuision of words, is three wayes considered: when a worde of double vnderstanding is deuided into his seuerall significatiõs: or when an whole is deuided into his partes: or else when a generall is deuided into his specials.

7 Here note, that thoughe euerye one of these foure wayes bee in common speech named and taken for a deuision, yet for learning sake, and to make a diuersitie amongst them, eche one hath his seuerall and proper name. The first beeing called an ordring of the cause: the seconde, a distinction of wordes: the thirde, a partyng of an whole: and the fourth, a deuiding of a generall.

8 Deuision differeth from partition, for that in a deuision, the generall is alwayes verified of his specials: where as in a partition the whole is not truely sayde of hys partes. Distinction differeth from them both: for they deuide matter, and it deuideth wordes or termes onely. The ordering of the

cause differeth from them three: for it intreateth of compounded matter: and they of thinges, as they are consydered without composition not coupled together in anye perfect sentence.

Rules belonging to this place.

9 A deuision ought to be playne, perfect, and briefe.

10 For playnnesse, ye oughte to seeke vsuall termes, and to auoyde borowed speeche as much as conueniently ye can.

11 For perfectnesse, ye must see that there be in the membres, neither too much, nor too little: that is to say, that nothing be reckned amõg the membres, which is not compriled in the whole: nor any thyng cõteyned of the whole, whyche is not set forth among the membres: that one membre bee not comprehended of an other membre: nor that any one thing be found to be vnder dyuers membres.

12 And for briefenesse, yée muste bryng your Deuision into as small a compasse as maye

may be: yet so, that if ye can not come to your purpose by your firste deuision: ye eftsoone deuide the partes, and that so ofte as nede shall require: But here ye muste beware, that yee doo not ouercharge or confounde the memorie of youre hearers, with many or confused deuisions.

Examples.

13 Your sugred talke wanteth one chiefe poynt of cunning. For in manye of youre Orations, eyther yee make an vnperfecte Deuisyon: or else yee vse to make none at all.

14 The matter wee stryue for, is conteyned vnder the firste parte of the Deuision: therefore ye doe wrong (the Deuision beeing good) to say, that it is conteyned vnder the seconde parte.

15 This thing is within the compasse of the principall: therefore of force it muste eyther bee a membre thereof: Or at the leaste be conteyned vnder one of the members.

Of Proportion. Chap. 25.

1 There are thrée sundry kyndes of proportions, taking their names of thrée seuerall artes, Arithmeticall, Musical, and Geometricall.

2 As for the two first, they serue nothing for oure purpose, bycause no good reasons can be gathered of them: wée will therefore intreate onely of the thirde:

3 Which Aristotle breefly defineth thus, expressyng it to bée an equalitie of reason: But to make thys sayewhat somewhat playne to them that are ignorant in Geometrie, It is to bée noted: that Geometricall proportion standeth alwayes in foure termes at the least: whereof the first hath that respect to the seconde, that the thirde hath to the fourth.

4 As. 2.4.8.16. for loke what respecte two beareth to four: and the same respect eight beareth to sixtene, either of them being an halfe part of that number, where vnto they are referred.

5 Now

5 Now then, he that will be perfecte in Geometricall proporcion, must firſt learn the fiue generall reſpectes that all numbers beare one to another, and howe by the knowledge of theſe fiue generall reſpectes, he maye come to know the name and value of all particular reſpectes what ſoeuer: whiche thing ye maye doe wyth ſmall payne, thus:

6 Euerye bigger number compared to a leſſer number, doth either, 1, containe it certaine times exactly, and neither more nor leſſe: 2, or els but once and one parte more: 3, or els once and many partes moe: 4, or els many times and one parte more: 5, or els at the vtmoſt it containeth it many times, and many partes moe.

7 The firſt is called manyfolde: the ſeconde an whole with one parte more: the thirde, an whole with many partes moe: the fourth manyfolde with one part more: and the fift is termed, manyfold with many partes moe.

8 Agayne, deuide theſe generall reſpectes into certayn of their ſeuerall kyndes, and ye ſhall ſee, as it were, howe to fynde

out the proper name of any respect whatsoeuer: I meane of two vncquall numbers compared together.

9 Manyfold is deuided into

twofolde, threefold, fourefold } as {2, 3, 4} to {1, 1, 1} or as {4, 6, 8} to {2, 3, 2}

&c.

10 Here may ye see, that foure hath that respecte vnto two, that two hath to one: and that the proper name of this respecte is termed twofold.

11 Againe that sixe do beare themselues so to two, as three doe to one: and that the speciall name of this respecte is called threefolde.

12 And also that eight do so often tymes force two, as foure do one: and that their particular respect is fourefold.

13 Now then if I argue and say that sixe must yelde three, for foure do yelde two: mine argument taketh his force of the rule of proportion: bycause sixe beare that equalitie in reason to three, that foure doe to two.

14 And so of anye foure numbers in all these

these examples, which stand in relwe one against another: ye may gather necessarye reasons as well to proue as to disproue.

15 And consequently thus may ye doe, with any other foure things whatsoeuer, when two, to two, beare like equalities of reason eche to other.

16 An whole with one part more is deuided into an whole with an

halfe parte, third parte, fourth part } as { 3, 4, 5 } to { 2, 3, 4 } or as { 6, 8, 10 } to { 4, 6, 8 }

&c.

17 An whole with many partes moe, is deuid into an whole with

twothird pts, threfourt pts, fourfift parts } as { 5, 7, 9 } to { 3, 4, 5 } or as { 10, 14, 18 } to { }

&c.

18 Manyfold with one part moze, is deuided

into
- twofolde with a — halfe parte moze, third parte moze, fourth part moze, &c. — as 5, 7, 9 to 2, 3, 4 or as 10, 14, 18 to 4, 6, 8
- threefolde with a — halfe parte moze, third parte moze, fourth part moze, &c. — as 7, 10, 13 to 2, 3, 4 or as 14, 20, 26 to 4, 6, 8
- fourefolde with a &c. — halfe parte moze, third parte moze, fourth part moze, &c. — as 9, 13, 17 to 2, 3, 4 or as 18, 26, 34 to 4, 6, 8

19 Manyfold with many parts moe, is deuided

into twofolde with two third partes moe, thre fourth parts moe, foure fift partes moe } as 8, 11, 14 } to 3, 4, 5 } or as 16, 22, 28 } to 6, 8, 10

&c.

into threefold with two third partes moe, thre fourth parts moe, foure fifte parts moe } as 11, 15, 19 } to 3, 4, 5 } or as 22, 30, 38 } to 6, 8, 10

&c.

into fourefold with two third partes moe, thre fourth parts moe, foure fifte parts moe } as 14, 19, 24 } to 3, 4, 5 } or as 28, 38, 48 } to 6, 8, 10

&c.

20 I haue set forthe these particular respectes, for that by them, and suche lyke, ye maye solute all suche questions, as are wrought in Arithmeticke by the rule of three, or as some doe terme it, by the golden rule: which in verye deede is the rule of proportion.

21 But there men are taught to worke by multiplication and deuision, whyche make the matter harde to them, that are ignorannt in that arte, and hide (as it were) the grounde and cause, why vpon suche workyng it should so fall forth: but here yée shall at the fyrste sighte, decyde the matter, perceyuing withall the reason thereof.

22 For if it be demaunded and said. iiij.s̄ in one yeare doe gayne. xvj.s̄. howe manye shillings shall. vj.s̄. gayne: ye maye aunswere and saye: seyng. iiij.s̄. are fyue tymes in. xvj.s̄. wyth two thyrde partes moe, I know that the summe demaunded muste contayne. vj. shillings fyue tymes and two thyrde partes moe of. vj.s̄. nowe then. xxvj.s̄. contayning. vj.s̄. fiue times, and fourtene groates beyng two thyrde

partes

partes of .viij.s: I see playnely that .viij.s. doe gayne in ons yeare .xxxix s.viij.d. and that the reason thereof is, for that .viij.s. are iuste, so ofte in.xxxix.s.viij.d, as .iij.s. are in.xviij.s.

A generall lesson for Inuention, teaching the vse of our third and fourth booke. Chap.26.

1 Aristotle in shewing a meane how to finde the proning terme, maketh but three places, the place of the foreset, the place of the backset, and the place of the biset.

The place of the { Foreset / Backset / Biset.

2 Foresets are called in Latine Antecedentia, bicause they come alwaies in a sentence afore ỹ verbe: backsets are termed Con-

Consequentia, because they come after: bi sets are named in Greeke ἀλλότρια by cause they are neuer knitte together in a yeasay: but alwayes sundred by a naysay.

3 Doubtlesse this deuision is very trim and naturall: for when the prouing terme is taken in the foresayes with the gene rall or special terme, it is either coupled to them by a yeasaye, or seuered from them by a naysay.

4 If it be coupled to them in a yeasaye, it is either placed afore or after the verbe: if it be placed afore, it beareth the name of a foreset: if it be set after the verbe, then doth it take the name of a backset: but if it be sundred from them by a naisay, then is it termed a biset, whether it be placed a fore or after.

5 So that the prouing terme, compared either to the generall terme, or the special term, must needes beare one of these three generall respectes: that is either to be a foreset, a backset, or a biset.

6 And because the prouing terme is repeted in euery reason by rule, twice, it followeth that it muste alwayes beare a

double

double respect, one to the generall terme, and another to the speciall terme, these two termes beyng euer extant, and plaine to be seene in the question it selfe.

7 This thing is set forth in our thyrde booke, both by rules and examples, and that both plainely, and at large: bicause it is a thing most necessary for a reasoner to be cunning and expert in.

8 Thus ye must euer marke, that where a reason by rule standeth but of three termes, two of them are euer contained in the conclusion, and therefore euident to be seene in the question at the first, the thirde terme is that which we call the proouing terme, & which we vse as a meane, whereby to conclude the matter that lieth in question, and so bring oure purpose to passe.

9 Nowe, howe the proouing terme must lye to the other two termes, that the question in controuersie maye be concluded ye muste learne by the foureteene seates set forth at large in our third booke, considering with your self, what maner of shewing the question doth containe, and in how

many particular ſeates, the ſame maye be concluded, and ſo ſhall ye plainely learne the double reſpect, that the proving terme muſt beare to the other two termes, I meane the generall terme, and the ſpeciall terme.

10 This done, ye muſt drawe your queſtion through the places, that is to ſaye, ye muſt drawe the wordes of your queſtion through the places, and when ye find any worde in any particular place, which beareth that reſpect to the generall and ſpeciall terme, that the rules of the third booke require, know ye of a certaintie, that that is the proving terme, & the meanes whereby ye may worke your feate.

11 So that ye muſte conne by hart, and haue on your fingers endes, the fourtene ſeates expreſſed in our third booke: and the 44. particular places ſet forth in this oure fourth booke. I thinke it good to name and order them thus:

1 Saywhat.
2 Generall terme.
3 Speciall terme.
4 Propertie.
5 Whole.
6 Partes.
7 Offspring.
} Substaunce.

8 Number.
9 Weight.
10 Bignelle.
} Quantitie.

11 Power.
12 Will.
13 Dispositions.
14 Qualities perceiued by sense.
15 Affections.
16 Passions.
17 Forme.
} Qualitie.

18 Matter, or stuffe.
19 Forme.
20 Workman, or doer.
21 Ende.
} Causes.

22 Effect, or worke.
23 Preparation and meanes to obtaine an ende.
24 Doyng.

25 Suffering.
26 Time.
27 Place.
28 Order.
29 Hauing.
30 Forecommers. } Commers.
31 Aftercommers. } Commers.
32 Withcommers } Commers.
33 Likelier.
34 Unlikelier.
35 Alike.
36 Similitude.
37 Witnesses.
38 Respecting termes, or yokefellowes } Gainsets.
39 Depriuing termes } Gainsets.
40 Contraries } Gainsets.
41 More then contraries, or denying termes. } Gainsets.
42 Differing termes.
43 Deuision.
44 Proportion.

How

Howv doubtfull Questions and demaundes are to be handeled. Chap. 27.

1 Nowe that we haue sufficientlye intreated of wordes, of sentences, of reasons, and of the places: it remayneth that we also intreat of a probable demaund, shewing an easye trade and way, howe doubtfull questions are to be discussed.

VVhat a Question or demaunde is.

2 A question or a demaunde is a shewsaye, requiring a yea, or a nay: as, do fishes breath in the waters, or no?

3 If you aunswere this demaunde, and make your choise, saying: eyther the fishes doe take breath vnder the water: or that they do not: ye make of a question a shewsaye.

4 But if ye procéede further, and adde a reason why ye so saye, in concluding of

your matter, ye turne the question into an endsaye.

5 So that in verye déde these thrée, a question, an endesaye, and a shewesay, differ nothing in substaunce of matter one from another: but in manner and forme of vtteraunce.

6 Onely examples shall make this matter cleare enough.

7 For this saying, doe fishes breath in the waters, or not? is a demaunde or a question.

8 But this saying, fishes do not breath in the waters, is a shewsaye.

9 And thys saying: then or therefore fishes doe not breath in the waters, is an endsaye.

10 Euery demaunde is not to be argued, and disputed vpon.

11 For, if it be either so manifestly true, or so manifestlye false, that no man can doubt of it, but he must seeme to want eyther stripes or sense: then the question is not to be reasoned of.

12 For the principles and grounders of ech liberall science, are not proued by any

other

other things of more credite, then they: but are manifeste of themselues: and as for suche things as sense can discerne, and iudge truely of, they admit no proufe, which lyeth by a reason framed in rule, but contentes theymselues wyth that knowledge, which commeth onely by the experience and iudgement of our outward senses.

13 Suche questions then, are onely disputable, as admit some doubt, and offer shew of matter to argue of and on.

14 And here by the waye yee maye see, that they whych thynke, that a man cunnyng in this Arte, is able to proue, the snowe to bee blacke, and the Crowe to be white, iudge vnskilfully of this worthye facultie, which purposely forbydeth the propounding of such fond stuffe.

15 Nowe that yee knowe what kynde of demaundes, are to bee reiected: and what kynde are to bee discussed by the helpe of thys Arte: it followeth that the handlyng of the question bee done on this sorte.

16 First learne by the Storchouses the

force of euery worde that is in your question: and if there bee wordes of double vnderstanding in it, laye forth their sundrie and diuers significations, leaste the speaker meane the word in one sense, and the hearer take it in another.

17 Secondlye, consyder what maner of shewsaye the wordes of the question doe make, when they are coupled together in a perfect sentence.

18 That is to saye, learne how the foreset and backset agree or disagree together, and what respecte, the one beareth to the other: whether the sentence containe one or many shewsayes: whether it bee generall or speciall: a yeasay, or a naysay: and so forth of other necessary pointes appertaining to the discussing of a shewsay, set forth in our second booke at this number side. 68. and verse. 8.

19 Thirdly search by how many shalles your sayde question maye be proued: and so shall ye knowe what generall respecte or alliaunce your proouing terme muste beare to the foreselette and backeset of the question.

20 Lastly

20 Lastely, seeke store of suche proouing
ermes by our discourse vpon the particular
places, drawing the partes of your questi-
on thorough them all, and hauing a greater
respect to choyce, then to store.

21 For fewe reasons or one good one,
are of more force, then manye,
whiche the gayneslayer
maye easily aun-
swere, and
cut off.
(:·)

Fol. 60. lin. 9. for chap. 14. reade chapter. 15.
Fol. 82. chap. 10. here note that the 11. & 12. chapters woulde haue bene placed afore the. 10.
Fol. 84. 1. the first, reade of the first: And agayn in the same verse is of, strike out of.
Fol. 92. lin. 14. smlal, reade small.
Fol. 98. lin. 11. for where, strike out for.
Fol. 142. in place of { 13 forecommers, 14 aftercommers, 15 withcommers.
they would haue bene set thus, } 13 commers { 1 forecommers 2 aftercommers, 3 withcommers.
Fol. 158. lin. 25. prouable, reade probable.
Fol. 176. lin. 9. whyche knowe, reade which foreknow.

¶ A note to vnderstand the meaning of newe deuised Termes.

FYrste consider the partes of eche compounded terme: then turne to that place in our Booke, which the two numbers do poynt forth, that are set vpon the word: And if thou be a Latinisste, take also that helpe, whyche the Latine terme dothe yelde.

Altering. 62.19. alteratio.

a Bounder. 20.3. so called, for that it poynteth forth the vtmost reach of any thing, terminus.

a Backsette. 71.1. prædicatum, consequens, attributum.

a Begetting or an ingendring, or a creating 60.2 generatio, ortus.

Contraries. 70.30. & 88.3. contraria, aduersa.

Corrupting. 60.3. corruptio, interitus.

Depriuing termes. 54.6. priuatiua.

Denying termes. 54.7. contradictoria, negantia.

Diffe

Difference. 80.1. differentia.

Diminishing. 62.18. diminutio.

the Decerning part. 138.4. Inditium.

an Endlay. 103.3. Conclusio. And after this latine worde, called a Conclusion. I call it an Endlaye, bicause it is a saying that maketh an ende of a reason.

a Foreset 7.11. Subiectum, antecedens.

Forelayes. 103.3. præmissæ.

a Grounded disposition. 30.22. habitus.

Gaynsets. 53.3. oppositæ, contrariæ.

ỳ Generall terme. 104.9. maius extremum, maior terminus.

an Hauing. 45.5. habitus.

an Inholder. 4.19. Subiectum.

an Inheer. 4.19. Accidens. It may be called also an Indweller, for that it resteth and dwelleth (as it were) in an other.

an Increasing. 62.18. augmentatio.

an Issaye. 93.5. propositio conditionalis.

a Kynde. 78.1. genus.

a Kinred. 77.5. species, forma.

Lykesounding wordes. 2, 8. æquiuoca, so termed, bycause in name and sound, they are lyke, though they haue sundry meanyngs.

More

The Table.

More then contrarie sayings. 89. 5. propositiones contradictoriæ, so called, for that there is greatter repugnancie in them, then in contrarie sayings.

Moving. 60. 1. motus.

Naylay. 84. 4. 5. negatio denominatiua.

Nprings. 161. 1. coniugata.

Ouerthew. 22. 17. superficies. so called, bicause it doth shewe the vtmost face, and viewe of a bodied thing.

Playnmeaning wordes. 3. 16. vniuoca.

Placing. 44. 1. situs.

Proprietie. 75. 1. proprium.

Parting thewesaye. 94. 10. propositio disiunctiua.

Preambles. 95. 1. modi.

The Proning terme. 104. 11. medium.

Respecting termes, which may also be called yokefelowes. 63. 3. relata, relatiua ad aliquid.

Reason by example. 100. 2. Inductio.

Reason by rule. 100. ratiocinatio.

Ranke. 106. 8. figura. 2.

Somewhat, 73. 1. definitio. corruptly called a definition: but for ỹ it is a thing which telleth what a thing is, it may more aptly be

ly be called a saywhat.
a Selfe thyng, or a sole thyng. 5.24.ℰ. 72. 2. Indiuiduum
Surmountyng generals. 49. 8. transcendentia.
a Storehouse. 7. 38. prædicamentum, attributum.
ſ Speciall terme. 104. 10. minus extremum, minor terminus.
a Seate. 106. 9. modus.
Want of naturall power, commonly called priuation. 27. 8. priuatio.
a Wauering diſpoſition. 31. 23. diſpoſitio.
a Wight. 146. 13. animal.
Wittcraft. 1. 1. virtus vel ratio diſſerendi. Thoſe names be alwayes accompted the beſt, which doe moſte playnly teache the hearer the meanyng of the thyng, that they are appointed to expreſſe: doubtleſſe neyther Logicke, nor Dialect can be thought ſo fit an Engliſhe woorde to expreſſe and ſet forth the [illegible] as Wittcraft is, ſeeing [illegible] mother tonge to [illegible] craft is the [illegible] whereby we [illegible]

The Table.

whiche two wordes knit together in
rafte, doe signifie the Arte that tea
witte and reason. And why shoulde
rafte and witchecraft bee good englishe
s? and Starcraft and Witcrafte bee
? the simples beeing knowne, and the
osition lyke.
alaye. 84. {4. affirmatio.
{5.

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